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The Ideals and Reality of a Legal Transplant – The Veil-Piercing Doctrine in China 
Shuangge Wen* 
 
In response to a significant change in China’s 2005 company law reform – the statutory inauguration of the piercing the veil 
doctrine, this paper critically examines the implementation of this common-law-originated doctrine in China’s unique socio-
economic environment. It was discovered that so far the practice of veil-piercing has largely derogated from its intended 
legislative goals. Factors beyond the realm of law, including the structure of the national economy, related policies, and 
mainstream jurisprudential thoughts, constrain the uniform applicability of this doctrine. Meanwhile, the congruence of this 
legal transplant has also been pragmatically compromised by various institutional factors. In view of the policy imperatives of 
encouraging investment and the continuing preponderance of the state-owned economy, this paper foresees an even more 
restricted role of the veil-piercing doctrine in China’s future commercial practice. 
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                               I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are few corporate law principles more intricate, and less settled, than that of when it is permissible 
to pierce the veil.1 However, the fact that there is room for debate about the precise meaning of this 
metaphor has not affected the overall consensus about its core function in qualifying limited liability.2 
Echoing the powerful rhetoric of aligning Chinese corporate law more closely with that of other 
developed economies,3 this doctrine of common law origin has recently been enshrined in China in form 
of a brief provision – Article 20(3) of the 2005 company law.4 This statutory change came about as one 
result of a long-lasting debate about corporate law reform, and it was welcomed with a chorus of praise 
from Chinese academics and legal practitioners as a “revolutionary development”.5 Indeed, compared to the 
rigid 1993 company law regime, which focussed on state-owned enterprise rather than entrepreneurial 
business,6 adding this doctrine into the 2005 company law framework and altering the conventionally 
rigid capital rules informs China’s current policy imperatives of encouraging more diversified forms of 
investment and business development, building up a regulatory environment with more clarity and 
consistency in order to safeguard market players’ interests, and steering the country towards a more liberal 
market regime.7 
Laudable legislative goals notwithstanding, until the present time many Chinese scholars have taken as a 
given, rather than as an assumption, the applicability of the piercing doctrine in China.8 The alleged civil 
                                                          
1 Notwithstanding its widespread applications in various jurisdictions, there remain some disputes on the conception and scope 
of veil-piercing. For instance, it is submitted that ambiguity and lack of principles have plagued the veil-piercing concept in 
common law jurisdictions for hundreds of years. See BC Reed, Clearing Away the Mist: Suggestions for Developing a Principled Veil 
Piercing Doctrine in China, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1643 (2006). Similarly, Farrar criticised the doctrine and related law as being 
“in a state of flux”. JH Farrar, Fraud, Fairness and Piercing the Corporate Veil, 16 CAN. BUS. L. J. 474, 479 (1989–1990). For discussions 
on the magnitude of the veil-piercing doctrine, see Thomas K Cheng, The Corporate Veil Doctrine Revisited: A Comparative Study of the 
English and the US Corporate Veil Doctrines, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. Rev. 329, 332 (2011); KW Wedderburn, A Corporation’s 
Ombudsman? 23 MOD. L. REV. 663, 666 (1960); Murray A Pickering, The Company as a Separate Legal Entity, 31 MOD. L. REV. 481 
(1968).  
2 As Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC commented in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] UKSC 34, at [80], “I have 
reached the conclusion that it would be wrong to discard a doctrine which, while it has been criticised by judges and academics, has been generally assumed 
to exist in all common law jurisdictions, and represents a potentially valuable judicial tool to undo wrongdoing in some cases, where no other principle is 
available.” See also Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of The Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 547 (1977). 
3 Mark Wu, Piercing China’s Corporate Veil: Open Questions from the New Company Law, 117 YALE L. J. 329, 330 (2007). 
4 “公司股东滥用公司法人独立地位和股东有限责任，逃避债务，严重损害公司债权人利益的，应当对公司债务承担
连带责任。” “Where the shareholder of a company abuses the independent status of the company as a legal person or the limited liability of 
shareholders, evades debts and thus seriously damages the interests of the creditors of the company, he shall assume joint and several liability for the debts 
of the company.”中华人民共和国公司法第二十条第三款. [Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated on 
Dec. 29, 1993 and effective Jul. 1, 1994, amended in 1999, 2004, and 2005) [Company Law 2005], art. 20(3), available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=50878  
5 Nairui Liu, Guanyu Jiekai Gongsi Miansha de Zairenshi: Cong Xifang Fenzheng dao Woguo Dinglun (关于揭开公司面纱的再认识：从
西方纷争到我国定论) [Revisiting Corporate Veil Piercing: Western Obscurity and Its Clarification in China], 12 J. BUS. ECON. 69 (2008). 
6 Robert C Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 273, 
275 (1995). 
7 Junhai Liu, Jiekai Gongsi Miansha Yingyong yu Sifa Shijian de Ruogan Wenti Yanjiu (揭开公司面纱制度应用于司法实践的若干问
题研究) [An Analysis of the Controversial Issues Regarding the Application of Piercing Corporate Veil in Judicial Practice] 305 J. L. APPLI. 16, 
16(2011). See also infra note 79 and relevant texts. 
8 See e.g., XUDONG ZHAO ET AL., XINGONGSIFA ZHIDU SHEJI (新公司法制度设计) [THE SYSTEMIC DESIGN OF NEW COMPANY 
LAW] 374 (2005), “(During the debate of reforming Company Law), only a very small number of scholars, for instance, Sibao Shen, have raised the 
concern that this veil-piercing doctrine is a common law principle… and therefore may not be suitable in our country.” Also Hui Huang, Piercing the 
Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and Where Is It Heading? 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743, 745 (2012), “China’s statutory veil-piercing law 
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law affiliation9 and the fledging state of the legal system10 have both led to a principal emphasis on 
lawmaking in China, with the corollary that less attention has been focused on enforcing laws.11 As 
succinctly noted by Potter, “the effectiveness of (a piece of law in China) … is asserted (or assumed) on the basis of the 
enactment of legislation rather than being based on empirical reality.”12 As such, while much ink has been spilled to 
unravel the intricacies of piercing from an ideological perspective, relatively few writers have examined 
whether its practical implementation has achieved the intended effects, or how well this transplanted 
doctrine has blossomed in the unique and distinctive soil of China.  
While one might not go as far as some realists, who attack scholarly attention to legal conception and 
ideology as being “arbitrarily … practical politics”,13 it is nevertheless sensible to appreciate that the life of 
the law lies in implementation. 14  The effectiveness of particular statutes and regulations is almost 
invariably shaped and compromised by the institutional environments in which they operate.15 While it is 
heavily influenced by Western legal norms,16 China’s legal system, embedded in a complex economic, 
political and ideological system that is unique and distinct from its Western counterparts, has long 
confounded Western scholars, particularly in the way that its laws and regulations are implemented.17 
Drawing on the text of relevant laws concerning veil-piercing, and the modest body of case judgements 
which have emerged to date, this article seeks to correct the current scholarly imbalance. With an analysis 
of the pressing issues pertaining to veil-piercing practices in China, it highlights a disparity between the 
desired legislative goals and the actual implementation, and, in a chain of causation, pinpoints institutional 
factors specific to the Chinese socio-economic setting that bear on current judicial practice. Part II sets 
the stage by briefly reviewing the connotation of the metaphor in the corporate law context. Part III then 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is essentially borrowed from common law jurisdictions.” See also Colin Hawes & Thomas Chiu, Flogging a Dead Horse? Why Western-Style 
Corporate Governance Reform will Fail in China and What should be Done Instead, 20 AUST. J. OF CORP. L. 25, 26 (2006) arguing that so 
far incorporating wide-ranging Western corporate law and governance principles has not yet produced the expected results in the 
management of China’s business enterprises. This is mainly because of “some basic flaws in the assumptions of those advocating ‘Western-
style’ corporate governance reform in China”. Clarke criticised the approach of measuring the Chinese legal system by means of “the 
Western rule of law ideal” in the sense that it fails to reflect China’s distinctiveness. See Donald C Clarke, Alternative Approaches to 
Chinese Law: Beyond the “Rule of Law” Paradigm, 2 WASEDA PROC. COMP. L. 49 (1998-1999). Likewise, Zhu challenged the “prevailing 
wisdom” of building up and evaluating the Chinese legal system using Western analytical and methodological approaches, 
suggesting that “[v]isions …drawn from distinctly Western experience are not particularly meaningful for modern China, and evaluations and 
judgements based on these experiences or from their underlying ideology…have limited academic value and practical use for China.” See Suli Zhu, The 
Party and the Courts in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 52-53 (Randall 
Peerenboom ed., 2010). 
9 “In the system of the civil law and of codified law, legislation occupies the most highly respected place as a source of law. … Inquiry usually begins with 
the codes and other legislation, then it seeks out the commentators and the treatises, and only in third place do cases come in for consideration and 
evaluation.” Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 426 & 430 (1967). 
10 Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 38 (2006–2007). 
11 See e.g. Donald C Clarke, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 1, 
3 (1991–2): “So far, most scholarly analysis has been concerned with the contents of reform policies. Yet the means available to the government to effect 
these policies have been less well studied.” 
12 PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALISATION AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE, 81 (2001), quoted in 
Lubman, supra note 10, at 38. 
13 Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad 248 N.Y. 339 at 352, 162 N.E. 99, at 103 (1928) Judge William Andrews. 
14 BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT, 299 (6th ed., 2012). 
15 Clarke, supra note 11, at 3. 
16 “At the level of legal doctrine, China has passed a number of laws that not only resemble but are modelled on laws from other jurisdictions.” See 
Randall Peerenboom, Globalisation, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s 
Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 165 (2001). 
17 Peter Howard Corne, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 369 (2002). As such, China “is often used 
as a counterexample to convergence theories.” Peerenboom, id., at 174. 
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takes up the major legislative imperatives underpinning the new piercing provision in China’s 2005 
company law. In contrast with these laudable legislative agendas, Part IV points out a number of thorny 
issues that have surfaced in application, the most prominent of which is the doubtful applicability of veil-
piercing in the state-owned enterprise sector. Other problems in application include a compromise of 
legal consistency verified by a wide array of conflicting judgements; and a worrisome trend for 
unwarranted applications – regardless of the legislative emphasis on the limited use of piercing, this 
doctrine has been overly stretched in many instances.  
In searching for the potential roots of these practical deficiencies, many have pointed to the highly factual 
nature of veil-piercing cases and the defective drafting of the statutory provision in the 2005 Company 
Law, arguing that while the level of generality of this principle allows for flexibility in real life applications, 
it also risks vagueness and inconsistency in implementation, as evidenced in the practice. 18  While 
legislative vagueness might be a convenient scapegoat, one should not overlook the influence of legal 
institutions that impinge on practice, as well as the macro socio-economic environment in which the law 
operates. After all, legal regulation is not a mere jurisprudence of concepts and logic orders; there is a 
need for a more contextual, less ideological approach to assessing the effectiveness of transplanted legal 
principles.19 As will be discussed in Part IV, the overriding socio-economic feature of China’s economy, 
i.e. the dominant role of the State in the national economy, has consolidated the instrumental view of law 
among mainstream Chinese jurists,20 which has led to an uneven application of piercing between the 
state-owned and private economic sectors. Despite the Chinese government’s vows to implement a 
consistent and uniform application of law, practice has shown that the piercing doctrine has been least 
effective in cases where it is probably needed the most, namely state-owned enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) 
and large listed enterprises.  
As for its applications in private corporate sectors, there are a number of legal institutional deficiencies 
specific to the Chinese national context, including the lack of supplementary interpretations, excessive 
judicial discretion, and loopholes in connected areas of law, all of which contribute to the doctrine’s 
suboptimal results in practice. Isolated denunciations of the lack of a clearly-worded provision fail to 
capture the contextualised legal reality as well as the holistic nature of legal institutions. In view of the 
policy imperatives of encouraging investment and the continuing preponderance of the state-owned 
economy, this paper foresees an even more restricted role for the veil-piercing doctrine in China’s future 
commercial practice. 
II. THE CONNOTATION OF THIS METAPHOR 
 
                                                          
18 See e.g. Wu, supra note 3, at 330. 
19 Randall Peerenboom, Introduction in in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 
12 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010). 
20 An instrumental view of law means the use of legal rules by a government to achieve particular substantive ends. Eric W. Orts, 
The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 82 (2001). 
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An attribute fundamental to the modern corporate form is its separate legal status,21 though intriguingly 
this feature has been considered more extensively in relation to its exceptions.22 The veil conferred by 
incorporation denotes that acts done in the name of and on behalf of a company are treated in law as the 
acts of the company, not of the individuals who are involved. 23  In simple terms, a distinction is 
maintained “between an incorporated company’s legal entity and its actions, assets, rights and liabilities on the one hand, 
and the individual shareholders and their actions, assets, rights and liabilities on the other hand.”24  
Notwithstanding nearly universal support for this corporate entity concept and its corollary, limited 
liability,25 it is generally agreed that concessions to businessmen should not be without limitations.26 
Originating in the United States,27 the metaphor of veil-piercing has thus far been employed to define 
exceptions to the well-received separate entity principle.28 At its most basic, penetrating the corporate veil 
prevents shareholders from being insulated from personal responsibility for liabilities incurred by the 
firm. 29  However, since it is device for disregarding the individual personality of a corporation, 
consequences other than rendering shareholders liable for corporate debts can follow veil-piercing.30 An 
example is Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne,31  in which shredding the veil of the corporation was done 
primarily to honour a non-solicitation clause in an employment contract. Likewise, in FG (Films) Ltd, Re,32 
an unsuccessful argument for the separate status of a UK company from a US one was intended to 
                                                          
21 PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW, 35 (9th ed., 2012). 
22 Pickering, supra note 1, at 482. 
23 Jennings v Crown Prosecution Service [2008] UKHL 29, at [16]. English examples are used here simply because there are a number 
of cases that nicely illustrate the kind of cases where one needs to lift the veil. 
24 EBM Co Ltd v Dominion Bank, [1937] 3 All ER 555, at 564-5, per Lord Russell of Killowen.  
25 “The questionable but judicially accepted reasoning which regards limited liability as a result flowing out of the legal entity theory follows a simple 
route: The corporation is a separate entity; hence the obligations incurred in the operation of the business are those of the corporation itself, and the 
shareholders are not personally liable on these obligations.” Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary, 18 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473, 473 (1953). For discussions on the rationales underpinning limited liability, see infra notes 46–48 
and relevant texts. 
26 Richard S Kohn, Alternative Methods of Piercing the Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B. U. L. REV. 123, 125 (1968). 
27 Pickering, supra note 1, at 482. 
28 In Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No. 1) [1994] 4 All ER 769, Staughton LJ attempted to distinguish between 
“lifting the veil” and “piercing the veil”: “[T]o pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve for treating the rights or liabilities or 
activities of a company as the rights or liabilities or activities of its shareholders. To lift the corporate veil or look behind it, on the other hand, should 
mean to have regard to the shareholding in a company for some legal purpose.” In Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] UKSC 34, at [60] 
& [61], Lord Neuberger had a similar classification of cases underpinned by two distinct principles, “namely those concerned with 
concealment and those concerned with evasion…Cases concerned with concealment do not involve piercing the corporate veil at all”. China does not 
seem to support such a detailed classification. Judging from the mainstream interpretations to Art. 20(3), the main purpose of 
“disregarding the corporate veil” in Chinese law is to impose debt liabilities on shareholders. See infra notes 39 & 216. In this regard, 
Chinese law is more in line with the comments of Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC (with whom Lord Wilson JSC agreed) in Prest 
v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] UKSC 34, at [92]: “I am not sure whether it is possible to classify all of the cases in which the courts have 
been or should be prepared to disregard the separate legal personality of a company neatly into cases of either concealment or evasion…But what the cases 
do have in common is that the separate legal personality is being disregarded in order to obtain a remedy against someone other than the company in 
respect of a liability which would otherwise be that of the company alone (if existed at all).” 
29 “As the case may be, when a court determines that the debt in question is not really a debt of the corporation, but ought, in fairness, to be viewed as a 
debt of the individual or corporate shareholder or shareholders.” See STEPHEN B PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, 1-6 (1998). On 
this count, piercing the corporate veil is interpreted as “expanding the ideals of equitable subordination and of fraudulent conveyance law.” See 
Clark, supra note 2, at 506. 
30 Davies & Worthington, supra note 21, at 215; Cheng, supra note 1, at 345. The corporate entity form may also be disregarded to 
impose liabilities on directors, with no impact on the limited liability of shareholders. E.g., Harold Holdsworth & Co v Caddies [1955] 
1 WLR 352 (HL). There also exist statutory provisions which disregard the separate legal status of the corporation and impose 
liability on company directors, e.g., s. 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (hereinafter IA) in the UK. However, it is submitted that 
these are not true piercing actions in the sense that “the corporate entity is discarded and liability attached to the members of the company”. See 
BRENDA HANNIGAN, COMPANY LAW, 57 (2nd ed., 2009). 
31 [1933] Ch. 935. 
32 [1953] 1 WLR 483. 
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qualify a film produced by the UK company as British, so as to gain certain subsidy advantages. In some 
cases the veil-piercing doctrine even work in a reversible manner to impose liability on a corporation for 
the obligations of its shareholder(s). A landmark judgment in the US 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, G.M. 
Leasing Corp. v United States, 33  illustrates such thinking at work, where the court permitted U.S. 
government’s reverse piercing claim after finding that the individual who failed to pay taxes was an equity 
owner of G.M. Leasing Co.34 In some cases, the piercing the veil doctrine can even reversely work to the 
detriment of creditors. A recent UK Supreme Court judgment Stone & Rolls v Moore Stephens35 probably 
best exemplifies this point: being the exclusive owner and controller of a company, it is only logical to 
attribute a shareholders’ fraudulent intention to the company; and the company (or more accurately, the 
creditors standing in its insolvent shoes) could not rely on its own illegal fraud when bringing a claim 
against the others.36 Given the varied scenarios under which the rule is triggered, in practice courts have 
developed various labels that may be attached to veil-piercing applications. As stated, “some veils pierce when 
the corporation is the controlling shareholder’s ‘alter ego’, others when the firm is the controlling shareholder’s ‘corporate 
dummy’, and still others when it is his ‘instrumentality’.”37 
In contrast to the broad dimension of the piercing doctrine in common law jurisdictions, the principle is 
narrowly formulated in China, functioning simply as ex post creditor protection against shareholders. The 
institution of disregarding corporate personality – a Chinese expression which approximates veil-
piercing38 – is now set out in Art. 20(3) of Company Law 2005 as follows: 
Where the shareholder of a company abuses the independent status of the company as a legal person or the limited 
liability of shareholders, evades debts and thus seriously damages the interests of the creditors of the company, he shall 
assume joint and several liability for the debts of the company. 
From the litigation standpoint, triggering this provision means that creditors’ claims are no longer 
confined to the company’s assets, but can penetrate to reach the personal assets of shareholders.39 In this 
                                                          
33 514. F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1975). 
34 Today, reverse piercing is regularly applied in U.S. tax cases as “the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) routinely uses the remedy to attach 
assets of a corporation to satisfy debts owed by individual shareholders.” See Nicholas Allen, Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil: A 
Straightforward Path to Justice 16 N.Y. Bus. L. J. 25, 27 (2012). 
35 [2009] 1 AC 1391. 
36 “I consider that ‘Piercing the corporate veil’ … is simply a label…to describe the disparate occasions on which some rule of law produces apparent 
exceptions to the principle of the separate juristic personality of a body corporate reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 
[1897] AC 22… If there is a small residual category in which the metaphor operates independently no clear example has yet been identified, but Stone 
& Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] AC 1391, mentioned in Baroness Hale JSC’s judgement, is arguably an example.” Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] UKSC 34, at [106]. 
37 STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 151 (2002). 
38 Chao Xi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: How did We Get There? 5 J. BUS. L. 413, 424 (2011). 
39 For this reason, some literature has given this type of case the label of shareholder liability cases. See e.g. KAREN 
VANDERKERCKHOVE, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: A TRANSNATIONAL APPROACH 13 (2007). This narrow formulation is not 
least owing to the fact that China does not recognise unlimited companies, i.e. limited liability is a fundamental attribute of all 
companies incorporated under the Company Law in China. According to Articles 2 & 3 of the Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, two types of companies are permissible in China, namely limited liability companies (LLCs) or joint stock 
limited companies. Shareholders’ limited liability is prescribed as follows: “As for a limited liability company, the shareholders shall be 
responsible for the company to the extent of the capital contributions they have paid. As for a joint stock limited company, the shareholders shall be 
responsible for the company to the extent of the shares they have subscribed to.” “The Chinese LLC is similar to the private company or close 
corporation in Anglo-American jurisdictions while the (joint stock limited company) corresponds to the public company or publicly held corporation.” See 
Huang, supra note 8, at 752. 
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regard, China has largely followed the US path where the bulk of the veil-piercing cases concern 
shareholder liability alone.40  Further to this general legal proposition, a specific piercing rule is also 
provided for one-man companies in Art. 64 of the new company law scheme.41 Thus far, in all the veil-
piercing cases concerning one-man companies in China, the corporate veils have been set aside by the 
courts.42 
III. LEGISLATIVE AGENDAS UNDERPINNING VEIL-PIERCING IN CHINA  
 
A discussion of the application of veil-piercing should take as its starting point the objects it seeks to 
achieve, which connect primarily to the perennial conflict of interest between the members and the 
creditors of a corporation.43 This section, consisting of two parts, devotes itself to this matter. 
 
A. Balancing Shareholders’ and Creditors’ Interests 
 
For many, the overwhelming entrenchment of limited liability in modern company law generates a visible 
discrepancy in the risks and rewards for two primary corporate constituencies – shareholders and 
creditors. Shareholders can cap their liability when insolvency threatens, but their chance of gain is 
unlimited.44 However, the other category of suppliers of capital to a limited liability corporation are left 
with residual risk and become comparably disadvantaged. 45  The pragmatic continuance of such an 
disparity of interest has so far been justified on multiple grounds; to name but a few: creditors bear a 
                                                          
40 Cheng, supra note 1, at 344. 
41 Given that Art. 20(3) comprises a part of Chapter 1 – General Provisions, while Art. 64 is in Chapter II which delineates 
special rules concerning the establishment and organisational structure of a Limited Liability Company, Art. 64 will take priority 
over Art. 20 in the one-man company context, in accordance with the principle that “if a special provision differs from a general provision 
(in the case of national law, administrative regulations, local decrees, autonomous decrees and special decrees, and administrative or local rules enacted by 
the same body), a special provision shall prevail”. See Art. 83 of the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China, passed on 15 
March 2000, promulgated from 1 July 2000. This principle can be traced back to the doctrine Lex specìalis derogate legì generalì. Gu 
Jianya, An Analysis of the Difficulties concerning the Doctrine of “Special Provisions Override General Provisions (2007) 12 Academic Forum 
124 (in Chinese). 
42 Hui Huang, An Empirical Study on the Veil-Piercing System in China, 34 CHINESE J. L. 3 (2012). For the purpose of this article, our 
discussion will focus only on practices connected to the general legal proposition of veil-piercing – Art. 20(3) of the 2005 
Company Law. 
43 LAIJI HUANG ET AL. (EDS), WANSHAN GONGSI RENGE FOUREN ZHIDU YANJIU (完善公司人格否认制度研究) [RESEARCH 
INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF DISREGARD OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY], 274 (2012). 
44 PL DAVIES, S WORTHINGTON & E MICHELER, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW, 194 (8th ed., 
2009). 
45 In this regard, we are not that sympathetic to banks with qualifying security interests. It is suppliers of goods and services, and 
those with claims against the corporation arising out of goods and services supplied by it, who often get the raw deal. Cf. the 
“asset partitioning” argument, which suggests that limited liability works not only for the benefit of shareholders, but also that of 
creditors. Under the limited liability regime, it is presented that creditors of a company are isolated from creditors of shareholders 
or of other companies in a group, and as a consequence the relevant monitoring requirements and costs are effectively limited. 
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organisational Law, YALE L. J. 110 (2000); John Armour & Michael 
J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, (ESRC Cent. for Bus. Research, Cambridge Working Paper No. 299, 2005). 
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substantial portion of the risk of business failure as a desirable way of maximising the firm value;46 
limited liability is indispensable in setting up and operating a mature security market;47 and it is easier for 
creditors to catch sight of good investments when the personal wealth of shareholders no longer affects 
the financial health of the corporation.48 On the other hand, a number of moral hazards could be 
generated by an unwarranted expansion of limited liability, most prominently an incentive in 
corporations and those running them to engage in risky activities and transferring the costs to creditors.49 
Piercing the corporate veil thus operates as an exception to the paramount limited liability regime, 
bestowing redress on the ostensibly weaker party – creditors – and serving a normative ideal of justice in 
the general economic landscape.  
In China the privileges of incorporation and limited liability have been obtainable since the inception of 
the modern Chinese company law in 1993, enabling investors to embark on risky ventures without 
personal liability.50 However, the ex-post creditor remedy of veil-piercing did not find a place in this 
framework.51 Instead, a line of rigorous rules governing the raising and maintenance of capital – a 
traditional creditor protection mechanism “as old as limited liability itself”52 – characterised the 1993 regime. 
Demanding minimum capital thresholds of between RMB 100,000 and RMB 500,000 were enshrined in 
Art. 23,53 which had to be fully paid up by shareholders prior to company registration.54 Given that the 
average wage of a formal employee in China in 1995 was only 5,500 RMB per annum,55 these capital 
thresholds prescribed in the 1993 company law were considered almost insurmountable at that time, 
particularly for small businesses and individual investors. In addition to rigid minimum capital 
requirements, a number of strict capital maintenance rules continued to govern corporate operations, 
                                                          
46 E.g. Posner maintains that creditors are suitable risk bearers because they are less risk averse than shareholders, or they have 
superior information. Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976). Easterbrook 
and Fischel contest this argument and suggest that creditors are more risk averse than shareholders. The benefit of limited 
liability lies primarily in that it decreases the cost of searching for good investments, for both stockholdes and creditors. Cf. FH 
Easterbrook & DR Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985).  
47 It is submitted that limited liability facilitates the trading of the company’s shares because the personal wealth and conditions of 
different shareholders no longer attach diverse values to companies’ shares. Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, 
An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117, 130-1 (1980); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra 
note 47, at 92. 
48 Easterbrook & Fischel, ibid., at 92. 
49 Easterbrook & Fischel, ibid., at 104; Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 
YALE L. J. 1, 65–76 (1980). 
50 O. Kahn-Freund, Some Reflections on Company Law Reform, 7 Mod. L. Rev. 54 (1944). 
51 Although the legal representative of a corporation was not personally liable for corporate debts under the 1993 company law, 
the legal representative might be fined or subject to administrative sanctions  if the corporation engages in business beyond its 
authorised scope, conceals facts from registration and tax authorities, or hides property to evade repayment of debts. Art. 49 of 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated on Dec. 29, 1993 and effective Jul. 1, 1994, [hereinafter Company 
Law 1993]; see also Art & Gu, supra note 6, at 294. 
52 Davies et al., supra note 44, at 258. 
53 The minimum capital required of a company varied in keeping with its nature of business. It was RMB 500,000 for a company 
engaged primarily in manufacturing or in wholesale, RMB 300,000 for a company engaged primarily in retail, and RMB 100,000 
for a company engaged primarily in research and development, consultancy or service provision. Art. 23 of Company Law 1993, 
supra note 51. 
54 Art. 25 of Company Law 1993, supra note 51. 
55 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Database – Average Wage of Formal Employees by Sector (end of 
1995), available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1996e/D4-26e.htm.  
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notably, a 50% limit on outside investments that could be made by a corporation. 56  The creditor 
protection function of these capital rules was supposedly manifest in two aspects: they were to create 
genuine rather than “empty-shell” investment vehicles by preventing frivolous incorporation;57 and they 
were to furnish a sufficient material basis – the so-called “equity cushion”58 – for a company’s operation so 
that the risk of insolvency, if not eliminated, could at least be reduced for the benefit of creditors.  
Given that the Chinese legal system was primarily modelled on the legal regimes of Germany and the 
former Soviet Republics, both of which attached great importance to legal capital,59 this initial inclination 
of the Chinese legislators to construct an integral legal capital system is unsurprising. However, the 
efficacy of such a legal capital regime is quite another issue. In practice, the high level of minimum capital 
prescribed in Art. 23 of the 1993 Company Law very noticeably depressed investor enthusiasm and 
discouraged the growth of new companies.60 After all, it was arbitrary to presume that all businessmen 
with initial capital lower than the minimum requirement were incapable as entrepreneurs, or that they 
intended to misuse the corporate form. To circumvent these rigid capital rules, some regions issued their 
own interpretations or regulations governing corporate capital, which had the practical effect of making 
the 1993 company law almost fall out of use in these regions and led to significant inconsistencies in 
implementation.61  
Furthermore, this “equity cushion” for creditors will only function if available corporate capital can 
sufficiently offset the risks undertaken by the company.62 After all, creditors are more concerned about 
the ability of the company to pay its short-term and long-term debts, rather than the existence of a large 
amount of company capital reserve.63 Imposing a minimum capital threshold with reference to a level of 
assets frozen arbitrarily at the inception of the corporation, 64 will hardly serve this purpose, given that 
subsequent events may easily render the level of initial corporate capital irrelevant.65 In any event, the 
concept of legal capital has been shown to be “more important in theory than in practice in attaining the objectives 
                                                          
56 To maintain the level of company capital so as to protect the interests of company creditors, Art. 12 of the 1993 Company Law 
stipulated that the aggregate amount of investment which a company may invest in other limited liability companies or joint stock 
limited companies shall not exceed 50% of the net assets of the company. As revealed in practice, this constraint has severely 
depressed the development of legitimate corporate activities. See Ping Jiang, Xudong Zhao & Su Chen, Zhongguo Gongsifa de Xiugai 
ji Jiazhi (中国《公司法》的修改及价值) [The Amendment and the Value of the Company Law of PRC] (2005), available at 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleId=31305. 
57 Gordon Y.M. Chan, Why Does China not Abolish the Minimum Capital Requirement for Limited Liability Companies, Comp. Law. 306, 
307 (2006); ZHAO ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 8, at 237–239. 
58 DAVIES ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 44, at 263. 
59 “The former Soviet Union Republics’ reforms in the late 19th and early 20th century were modelled primarily on German law.” Owen, The 
Corporation under Russian Law 1800–1917 (Cambridge, CUP); International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, National Reports, 
(Tübignen, JCB Mohr 1972), at 1. 
60 Liu, supra note 7, at 16. 
61 For instance, despite the 10 million RMB minimum capital prescription for setting up a joint stock company enshrined in Art. 
78 of the Company Law 1993, the Shanghai municipality issued its own regulations requiring only 5 million RMB to set up a joint 
stock company in its own region. See Provisional Regulations of Shanghai Municipality on Joint Stock Companies. This 
Regulation remained in force until 23 September 1997, three years after the promulgation of the 1993 Company Law (effective 
from 1 July 1994). 
62 DAVIES ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 44, at 263. 
63 The High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory 
Framework for Company Law in Europe, 79 (2002). 
64 Harvey Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil – The Undercapitalisation Factor, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 18 (1982–3). 
65 Ibid., at 4. 
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that are assigned to it”.66 For regions that had complied with the 1993 capital thresholds, such stringent 
requirements have had little pragmatic effect in eliminating fraud and speculative activities carried out in 
corporate form. As has been proven in practice, rather than eliminating fraudulent “shell” companies and 
offering effective protection to creditors as intended, the period since the promulgation of the 1993 
company law has seen an upsurge in chronic problems and cases in which investors evaded initial capital 
contribution requirements by various methods, such as not providing the stipulated amount of cash or 
other assets, or surreptitiously withdrawing contributed capital shortly after incorporation.67  
In the face of a preponderance of evidence challenging the stringent legal capital rules, 68  Chinese 
lawmakers have increasingly been under pressure to reform company law.69 Indeed, given accelerating 
economic development and globalisation, and an increased need for foreign investment, 70  China’s 
company law reform has been set as a legislative priority in the new millennium.71 The primary agenda of 
this legislative amendment emphasises “encouraging & stimulating investment”, in line with pressure to 
maintain the rapidity of industrial and economic development.72 Professor Ping Jiang, a leading member 
of the High-Level Expert Group for Company Law Reform, neatly stated the rationale dictating this 
agenda: “We need to have businesses first before we can start talking about governing them. If we merely concentrate on 
disciplining the businesses, without providing sufficient support or stimulus, the nation’s economic and business development 
will be severely jeopardised.”73 To this end, the balance between shareholders and creditors was tilted in the 
latter’s favour in the 2005 company law framework, on the grounds that too much indulgence to creditors 
could generate hazards in terms of risk-averse decision-making and business inhibition. 74  Two 
amendments of company law followed this overhaul of priorities: first, provisions facilitating the creation 
of more forms of business, including one-man companies75 together with greatly reduced minimum 
capital thresholds;76 and secondly, provisions conferring a greater degree of autonomy on shareholders 
over corporate operations77 than had existed before.78 On a broad spectrum, this implies a greater reliance 
                                                          
66 Supra note 63, at 78–9. 
67 ZHAO ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 8, at 244. 
68 Jiang et al., supra note 56. 
69 Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back – A Modest Complaint, 11 Colum. J. Asian L. 127, 
136 (1997); Art & Gu, supra note 6, at 276. 
70 Jonathan M Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant 
Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 840 (2003). 
71 Ping Jiang, Guanyu Gongsifa Xiugai de Jige Wenti (关于公司法修改的几个问题) [Several Issues concerning the Reform of Company Law 
of PRC] (2006) Civil and Commercial Law Network, available at http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=24230.  
72 Howson, supra note 69, at 136. 
73 Jiang et al., supra note 56.  
74 It is submitted that unlike shareholders, who are residual claimants and have an allied interest with the solvent company, 
creditors normally secure their interests in the company via contracts and thus have an incentive to prevent managers from taking 
entrepreneurial risks, which may cost the company in terms of its ability to attract new investment and stay competitive in the 
modern business world. See FH Easterbrook & DR Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. Econ. 39 (1983); also A. Sandaram & 
A. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCIENCE 350, 354 (2004). 
75 The 2005 Company Law devoted an entire chapter to this matter. See Company Law 2005, supra note 4, Chapter 3. 
76 Prior to the 2005 reform, the minimum registering capital requirement for registering a company was 100,000 RMB. This 
threshold has now been reduced to 30,000 RMB. See Company Law 2005, supra note 4, art. 26. 
77 More autonomy is mainly conferred by way of improving the position of Articles of Association in determining key corporate 
issues, e.g. the distribution of dividends (Art. 35 of the Company Law of the PRC 2005), the amount of corporate investment or 
guarantee (Art. 16 of the Company Law 2005), and shareholders’ voting rights (Art. 43 of the Company Law 2005). It has been 
proved that the revised minimum thresholds have greatly stimulated investment activities. Since the promulgation of the new 
Company Law, the number of registered companies has largely increased. See Yanfeng Chen, Shanghai Shishi Xingongsifa de Tansuo 
11 
 
on the rhetoric of  the Anglo-American market-based system in today’s China corporate law regime, 
instead of  the conventional German ideals.79  
With the policy shift in shareholders’ favour comes an inevitable call for balancing the protection offered 
to creditors, the corollary of the privilege of limited liability.80 Because of the frequency of misconduct 
among controlling shareholders against small creditors in listed companies after the promulgation of the 
1993 Company Law,81 the lawmakers cast significant doubt on the conventional ex ante minimum capital 
shield for creditors, and eventually moved towards ex post protection, enshrining the notion of piercing 
the veil of incorporation as a functional substitute. However, because of its potential to discourage 
investment,82 the lawmakers emphasised on various occasions that the veil-piercing doctrine should be 
applied “with great caution”.83 From an economic standpoint, an extended application of veil-piercing would 
conflict with the efficient centralised decision-making apparatus, considered to be “the hallmark of modern 
corporations”.84 Growing risks of personal liability might also reduce shareholders’ capacity to diversify their 
investment and thus increase the costs of capital for the public firm.85 From a legal aspect, an undue 
exploitation of this doctrine not only runs the risk of eroding established corporate law foundation – the 
separate personality of the corporation and limited liability – but also has negative impacts on other 
aspects of law, such as taxation, environmental disputes, and security laws.86 As reiterated by the Law 
Commission of China, while it is attractive to adopt the veil-piercing doctrine in order to “protect creditors’ 
interests and preserve normal economic order”, the application should in no way undermine the fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(上海实施新公司法的探索) [An Exploration of the Implementation of the New Company Law in Shanghai], in Wanshan Gongsi Renge 
Fouren Zhidu Yanjiu, (完善公司人格否认制度研究), [Research into the Principle of Disregard of Corporate Personality], 184 
(Laiji Huang et al. eds., 2012), at 184. 
78 Under the 1993 company law, shareholders were already conferred a number of rights resembling those of shareholders under 
American law, such as the rights to inspect financial records, elect and dismiss directors, set their salaries, and vote on 
fundamental changes such as mergers, dissolution and liquidation. Art & Gu, supra note 6, at 296. 
79 For instance, in the UK, a representative country of the Anglo-American regime, there is no minimum share capital 
requirement for setting up a private limited company. In stark contrast, a minimum share capital of €25,000 is required to register 
a private company in Germany. See HANNIGAN, SUPRA NOTE 30, at 18. In comparative studies, the Anglo-American model is 
often alternatively labelled the market-oriented, shareholder-centred or liberal model. The Continental model is variously known 
as the bank-oriented, stakeholder-centred or coordinated model. R. Aguilera, D. Rupp, C. Williams & J. Ganapathi, Putting the S 
Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-level Theory of Social Changes in Organisations, 32 ACAD. MNG’T REV. 836 (2007); C. 
Williams & J. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct (2005) 38 Cornell 
International Law Journal 493.  
80 After all, as presented by Kahn-Freund, it is one of the principal purposes of all corporate legislation to enforce the raising and 
maintaining of the capital as a guarantee fund for the company’s creditors. Kahn-Freund, supra note 50, at 60. 
81保中小投资者 新《公司法》将“揭开公司面纱”The New Company Law Will Pierce the Corporate Veil to Protect Medium and Small 
Investors, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1037/3180565.html; see also Randall 
Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 8. 
82 David M. Albert, Addressing Abuse of the Corporate Entity in the People’s Republic of China: New Thoughts on China’s Need for a Defined 
Veil Piercing Doctrine, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 873, 874-5 (2002). 
83 Jie Yuan, Woguo Gongsi Renge Fouren Zhidu de Chuangshe (我国公司人格否认制度的创设) [The Establishment of the Principle of 
Disregarding Corporate Personality in China], in WANSHAN GONGSI RENGE FOUREN ZHIDU YANJIU, (完善公司人格否认制度研究), 
RESEARCH INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF DISREGARD OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY, 8 (Laiji Huang et al. eds., 2012). 
84 Stephen M Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 490 (2001). 
85 A strong possibility of unlimited personal liability will discourage investors to diversify their portfolios, and will consequently 
lead to higher costs of capital. See Larry E Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 101-2 (1991). 
86 ALAN DIGNAM & JOHN LOWRY, COMPANY LAW, 36 (6th ed., 2010); Huang, supra note 8, at 758; see also Gallagher & Ziegler, 
Lifting the Corporate Veil in the Pursuit of Justice, J.B.L. 292 (1990). 
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principle that the shareholder’s liability is limited to its stated contribution to the company.87 Underlying 
the narrow statutory formulation of veil-piercing is the robust unwillingness of legislators to permit 
limited liability to be impeded. Nevertheless, as will be explored in the sections below, judicial practice has 
so far largely thwarted this commendable legislative aim. 
B. Accessibility and the Uniform Application of Law 
 
Another reason to introduce veil-piercing was an accessibility agenda – to eliminate practical overlaps and 
duplications and provide more legal clarity for members, creditors and other related parties. Although 
they had no statutory authority prior to 2006, it is not as if  the courts had been unable to look behind the 
curtain of  corporate personality when they were minded to do so.88 As admitted by the Supreme People’s 
Court (hereinafter the SPC), “The existing company law framework in our country has been unable to provide an 
effective solution to the problem [of  rampant abuses of  limited liability] … [There was] a sense of  helplessness when [the 
courts] applied the existing laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations to relevant [veil-piercing] cases.”89 In the policy 
debate on the enactment of  the 2005 company law, placing the veil-piercing doctrine on a statutory 
footing was well-received on the grounds that it would render company law more accessible, better 
understood, and more consistently applied.90 Accessibility generally is associated with legal transparency 
and ease of  use, and a positive correlation can be tacitly assumed between the accessibility of  the law and 
enhanced compliance with it.91 The statutory provision as to veil-piercing was envisaged as a necessary 
condition in providing greater clarity to investors and creditors as to when, if ever, piercing would occur.92 
In terms of judicial application, it was hoped that a clearly-prescribed statutory basis would eliminate the 
practical diversities across local courts and ensure greater uniformity in application.93  
 
An improved regulatory environment has become even more indispensible after China’s accession to the 
WTO. As part of her conscious efforts for all-round participation, China promised in the Accession 
Protocol to apply and administer in “a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws … pertaining to or 
                                                          
87 Kangtai Cao，Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa Xiuding Cao’an de Shuoming (关于中华人民共和国公司法修订草案
的说明) [An Explanation to the Amended Draft of Company Law of PRC], 2005年 2月 25日在第十届全国人民代表大会常务委
员会第十四次会议上的讲话 A speech delivered at the Fourteenth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 25 
February 2005, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2005-10/27/content_5343120.htm; see also Bingrong Liu, 
Chengwenfa xia Gongsi Renge Fouren de Sifa Shiyong (成文法下公司人格否认的司法适用) [The Judicial Application of the Statutory 
Piercing the Veil Doctrine], in WANSHAN GONGSI RENGE FOUREN ZHIDU YANJIU, 完善公司人格否认制度研究， RESEARCH 
INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF DISREGARD OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY, 251 (Laiji Huang et al. eds., 2012). 
88 Long before it was formally embodied in Company Law, veil-piercing had already been pragmatically exerted in a wide array of  
rules and judgements in a fragmented state. Veil-piercing used to be executed by Chinese courts on various legal grounds, 
including tort, agency, and the honesty and credibility principle. See Liu, supra note 7, at 16; Liu, id., at 244. 
89 QIONG ZHANG (ED.) XIN GONGSIFA XIUDING YANJIU BAOGAO III 新公司法修订研究报告[RESEARCH REPORTS ON THE 
NEW AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPANY LAW III], 18 (2005); translated and quoted in Chao Xi, Who Writes Corporate Law Rules? The 
Making of the ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil Rule’ as a Case Study, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CHANGE AND 
CHALLENGES, 170 (Guanghua Yu eds., 2011). 
90 Wu, supra note 3, at 333. 
91 Deirdre Ahern, Directors’ Duties, Dry Ink and the Accessibility Agenda, L. Q. REV. 114, 114 (2012). 
92 Wu, supra note 3, at 332. 
93 Ibid., at 333. 
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affecting trade”.94 Without a doubt this includes the designation and implementation of the provisions as to 
company law, vital legislation governing the primary form of business entities through which direct 
foreign investment in China is generally operated. 95 Given that veil-piercing connects closely with the 
rights, obligations and value of foreign capital in Chinese companies,96 a clear articulation and consistent 
utilization of this principle is obviously an important linchpin for an integral and advanced company law 
regime. Looking at company law in major developed economies, the international dimension of the veil-
piercing doctrine also led the lawmakers to conclude that a modern Chinese company law would look odd 
without one. 97  Drawing on laws from American and other Western developed economies, the 
inauguration of the piercing doctrine is thus regarded as a forward step towards conforming to 
international business standards, at least at the theoretical level.98  
 
IV. CONTRAST BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY   
 
A. Applicability of the Veil-Piercing Doctrine in the State-Owned Economic Sector 
 
Just as one would not expect legal reforms to occur in isolation from the socio-economic environment in 
which they operate, when a common law principle such as veil-piercing is transplanted into the Chinese 
legal system, inevitably its application will be affected by domestic conditions in the receiving jurisdiction. 
This section explores the impact of Chinese conditions on veil-piercing practice. It will be suggested that 
the dominance of the State has affected the even-handed legal application of veil-piercing in China. 
Despite the pledge of uniform application, the piercing doctrine actually works least in cases where it is 
probably needed the most – in relation to SOEs and large listed companies. 
a. The Supremacy of the State-Owned Economy in China 
 
Inspired and driven by Marxism,99 which sees society as merely superstructural, reflecting underlying 
economic conditions and the interests of the ruling class,100 in its early days the Chinese government 
                                                          
94 Art 2.A.2 of Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 11 November 2001, available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.pdf.  
95 According to Art. 218 of Company Law 2005, supra note 4, the limited liability companies and joint stock limited companies 
invested by foreign investors shall on a general basis be governed by this Law. 
96 Howson, supra note 69, at 134–5. 
97 ZHANG (ED.) SUPRA NOTE 89, at 18. 
98 One of China’s post-WTO policy imperatives is to seek conformity with long-accepted foreign norms. Pitman B Potter, 
Globalisation and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaption of Globalised Norms and Practices, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
119, 120 (2003). 
99 “[Marxism] is unique in that no other body of social thought became the doctrine of an important political movement and ultimately the orthodoxy of 
ruling parties in much of the world (initially in the Soviet Union and then the People’s Republic of China).” MDA FREEMAN, LLOYD’S 
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE, 1129 (8th edn., 2008). 
100 BIX, SUPRA NOTE 14, at 299. 
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regarded the public ownership of the means of production, represented and exerted by the State, as the 
one and only way of achieving Communism and eliminating unfair or oppressive aspects of society.101 
Logically, therefore, a dominant feature of China’s economy since 1949 has been the dominance of 
enterprise owned by the State as the representative of “the whole people”.102 A centrally-planned model was 
adopted to secure the dominance of the State in the economy; decision-making power rested with the 
government, with business targets across all industries being planned and issued to enterprises in the form 
of hierarchical administrative orders.103  
Underpinned by a subsequent ideological development that diverse business forms developed in capitalist 
countries could benefit a socialist system as well,104 China’s remarkable economic turnaround towards a 
market-based paradigm was initiated in the late 1970s.105 This policy shift was marked by the acceptance 
of foreign investment,106 the restructuring of banking and financial systems, and, most prominently, the 
corporatisation of many state-owned enterprises, which used to form the central pillar of the planned 
economy.107 Categories of investment vehicles have also significantly expanded, after private enterprise 
was officially acknowledged as an important component of the national economy.108 
Nevertheless, although the state-owned economy is now rivalled by increasingly diverse non-state 
sectors,109 its primacy is far from withering away.110 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to hold a 
position of dominance in China’s national economy, controlling natural resources, utilities, infrastructure 
and many other key industries.111 As has been shown empirically, the State tightly controls China’s listed 
                                                          
101 “At one time, the Chinese government prohibited the establishment of corporations or private ownership of stock because it deemed such concepts 
inconsistent with, or even heretical to, China’s political and economic system.” Art & Gu, supra note 6, at 282. 
102 Art & Gu, id., at 276. This ideological development in the late 1970s advocates the goal of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, 
i.e., combining the basic principles of Marxism with China national specifics. See 马克思主义中国化的两次历史性飞跃
Marxism with Chinese Characteristics – The Two Great Leaps, available at http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1018/c350436-
19312396.html  
103 GUANGHUA YU, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA: POLITICAL, ECONOMY AND LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE 24 
(2007); S Wen, The Achilles Heel that Hobbles the Asian Giant: The Legal and Cultural Impediments to Antibribery, 50AM. BUS. L. J. 483, 
512-4 (2013). 
104 Art & Gu, supra note 6, at 279. 
105 Chaobin Wang, Cong Jihuajingji dao Shehuizhuyi Shichangjiji de Weida Biange (从计划经济到社会主义市场经济的伟大变革) [A 
Great Transformation from the State-Planned Economy to Socialist Market Economy] 11 XINXIANG REV. (2008), available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/127229/127250/8344596.html. At the Plenary Session of the Communist Party Central 
Committee in 1984, the central committee has indicated that ownership and management of state-owned enterprises may be 
appropriately separated. This was codified in 1988, in the form of the Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People. 
See Art & Gu, supra note 6, at 278–9. 
106 The availability of Class B shares (for foreigners) and Class H shares (for shares traded on the Hong Kong stock exchange), 
beginning at the end of 1992, is indicative of China’s openness to foreign investment. See Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two 
Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 62, 67 (2003). 
107 Peerenboom, supra note 16, at 172–3. 
108 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, amended on March 14, 2004, Art. 11. 
109 Lubman, supra note 10, at 6. 
110 Peerenboom, supra note 16, at 173. Such liberal reforms of SOEs reached their peak with China’s WTO entry in 2001, but 
slowed after 2006 and then went into reverse, particularly after the financial crisis created serious doubt about the efficiency of 
free markets. See State-Owned Enterprises: The State Advances, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2012, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21564274.  
111 Jonathan R. Woetzel, Reassessing China’s State-Owned Enterprises, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (July 2008) available at 
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Reassessing_Chinas_state-owned_enterprises_2149. China’s state-owned enterprises also 
play an important role in the international arena, too. According to the US congressional commission, state-owned companies 
accounted for 90% of the value of Chinese investments in the US industrial machinery, aerospace, automobile and logistics 
industries between 2007 and the third quarter of 2011. Bob Davis, China’s Investments Prompt Call for New Rules, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Jan. 6, 2013. 
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firms through both concentrated ownership and influence on the boards; the ultimate controlling 
shareholders for more than 80% of Chinese firms are central or local governments. 112 Government 
agencies and government-affiliated entities together account for approximately 70% of the shares of listed 
Chinese corporations, and government representatives generally dominate the boards of these 
corporations.113 Up to 2008, the State was the biggest shareholder in 85% of the listed companies in 
China.114 Although the number of shareholders of listed companies has increased over the past three 
years, indicating a trend towards dispersed shareholding,115 the State still has a predominant position. In 
2012, within the top one hundred listed companies the largest state-owned shareholding amounted to 
84%, while the highest percentage of private shareholding was only 13%.116  
b. State-owned Economy in Law 
 
Reflecting “a regulatory ethic that posits the state as the primary agent for economic and social development”,117 law in 
China is mainly construed as a means to achieve the strategic goals set by the State,118 and the debate 
about whether China is now at the thin end of a “rule of law”119 or subscribing to a “rule by law”120 does not 
detract from this widespread “ideology-ridden” instrumental vision of law. 121  Some contend that this 
instrumental view imitates legal positivism, with legal rights defined as “grants from the State that may be 
                                                          
112 Qiao Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects, and Institutional Determinants, 52 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 
415, 429 (2006). 
113 Id., at 446. 
114 Ciyun Zhu, Yige Xuyao Jiji bing Jinshen Shiyong de Sifa Guize, (一个需要积极并谨慎适用的司法规则 ) [A Doctrine that Needs to 
be Proactively yet Cautiously Applied], in WANSHAN GONGSI RENGE FOUREN ZHIDU YANJIU (完善公司人格否认制度研究) 
[RESEARCH INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF DISREGARD OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY], 204 (Laiji Huang et al. eds., 2012). 
115 Protiviti Risk & Business Consulting, Corporate Governance Assessment Summary Report on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 
2012 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2012), available at http://www.protiviti.co.uk/China-en/Documents/CN-en-2012-
Corporate-Governance-Survey-Report.pdf, at 10. It was suggested by Chen that the policy imperative in the setting of Chinese 
stock markets was to shift the burden of loss made by SOEs from the state to the market. Zhiwu Chen, Capital Market and Legal 
Development: the China Case, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 451, 456 (2003). 
116 Protiviti Risk & Business Consulting, ibid., at 10. 
117 Pitman B Potter, Foreign Investment Law in the People’s Republic of China: Dilemmas of State Control, 141 CHINA Q. 155, 156 (1995). 
118 This is in line with socialist legal theory, which conceives law as a tool of the ruling class. See John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, 
The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes toward Property Rights in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735, 782–3 (1999). 
119 A thin theory of the rule of law circumvents debating the impact of political theories and emphasises only “the formal or 
instrumental aspects” of law. Thick versions of the rule of law, on the other hand, reiterate elements of political morality, and 
intertwine aspects of law and political regimes. See Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools 
Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 471–473 (2002). Judging by these thick versions, many regard 
China as lacking an established Western pattern of rule of law, which connects primarily to the Western conception of liberal 
democracy, underpinned by the multi-Party mechanism. For blame placed on China’s political ideology and the consequent 
failure to realise the rule of law in China, see Donald Clarke, The Bo Xilai Trial and China’s ‘Rule of Law’: Same Old, Same Old, THE 
ATLANTIC, Aug 21, 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/08/the-bo-xilai-trial-and-chinas-rule-of-
law-same-old-same-old/278868/; Chun Peng, Is the Rule of Law Coming to China? THE DIPLOMAT, Sept. 10, 2013, available at 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/10/is-the-rule-of-law-coming-to-china/.  
120 “Legal systems in which the law is only a tool of the State are best described as rule by law, whereas legal systems in which the law (at least in theory) 
imposes meaningful limits on State actors may merit the label rule of law.” Peerenboom, id., at 521, footnote 137. Peerenboom saw “China’s 
legal system as in transition toward rule of law but still falling short of the minimal standard of achievement required to be considered rule of law.” Id., 
at 525. In any event, the distinction between the rule of law and rule by law is not central to our discussion in this paper, as it is 
more of a conceptual division rather than a pragmatic one. In practice, there is no legal system that merely imposes limits on the 
State without encouraging the power of the State. It is also hard to draw the line of “meaningful limits”, as advocated by thick 
versions of rule of law theory. 
121 Jianfu, Chen, The Revision of the Constitution in the PRC, A Great Leap Forward or a Symbolic Gesture? 53 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 
(2004). 
16 
 
revoked and limited by the State as it sees fit”.122 That said, the historical evolutions of different legal systems 
have established that any rule of law and governance is embedded in and compatible with a particular 
institutional and value complex,123 stemming from economic forces124 and including coercive political 
power125 and normative pressures beyond legal forces.126 Likewise, the instrumental view of law in China 
also derives from its socio-economic contextual complex. Its profound historical heritage of 
Confucianism demanded collectivism and hierarchical obedience,127 and regarded the laws as a set of 
commands for assisting government bureaucrats as they governed the country. 128  Since 1949, the 
dominant Marxist jurisprudence also consolidated the view of law as a means to State economic and 
political ends. Though Marxists argue that the State and laws will eventually “wither away” with the 
realization of a communist society, Chinese scholars believe that the nation is still at an “initial stage of 
socialism”, and laws and legal institutions are still necessary to achieve social solidarity and promote policy 
imperatives. 129  Understandably, the supremacy of the state-owned economy is legitimised and reiterated 
in legal terms. As prescribed in the Constitution, the basis of the socialist economic system of the PRC is 
state-owned economy, representing “socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the 
whole people and collective ownership by the working people”.130 As to private economic sectors, which foreign 
investment and other private property rights fall within, they are “an important (but not leading) component” of 
China’s economy, and remain under the State’s supervision and control. 131  In terms of business 
operations, the superiority of state ownership directly connects to a dynamic by which governance is 
pursued by a sovereign political authority.132  Recent legislative developments further consolidate the 
superiority of state property rights, signifying the government’s efforts to preserve domestic values while 
                                                          
122 Peerenboom, supra note 119, at 483.  
123 Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 4. 
124 M. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANISATIONAL FORMS (2000). 
125  E.g. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership in CONVERGENCE AND 
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 69, 93–109 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds 2004). 
126 Ruth V Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants 28 ACAD. 
MGMT REV. 447, 449 (2003); NW Biggart, Explaining Asian Economic Organization: Toward a Weberian Institutional Perspective, 20 
THEORY & SOC’Y 199 (1991). 
127 The concept of Guanxi, originally derived from the Chinese language, is now widely used to describe the special relationships 
and interconnections among people in Chinese society. Howard Davies, Thomas K.P. Leung, Sherriff T.K. Luk & Yiu-hing 
Wong, The Benefits of “Guanxi”: The Value of Relationships in Developing the Chinese Market, 24 INDUS. MAR. MGMT. 207 (1995). 
128 Lubman, supra note 10, at 4. 
129社会主义初级阶段主要矛盾, The Main Conflicts in the Initial Stage of Socialism, available at 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/165617/173273/10357187.html. Also Orts, supra note 20, at 106, “The Chinese government seems 
to be moving strongly toward adopting rule by law in the instrumental, positivist sense of creating consistent and uniform “rules of the game” needed for a 
modern market economy.” 
130 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, amended on March 14, 2004, Art. 6. 
131 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, amended on March 14, 2004, Art. 11. 
132 Potter, supra note 98, at 125. Such an overriding position of the state-owned economy and state control over private sectors 
remains immune to challenge, as “no laws or administrative or local regulations may contravene the Constitution.” Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China, amended on March 14, 2004, Art. 5. 
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transplanting global norms.133 For instance, although recent developments of property law bear the strong 
imprint of the Western tradition, they in no way threaten the supremacy of the state-owned economy.134  
 
c. Incompatibility between the State-Owned Economy and Veil-Piercing – The Ideological 
Aspect 
 
For the purpose of this article, we need not try to seek answers about the desirability of state dominance 
in China.135 What does need to be acknowledged, however, is that this fundamental socio-economic 
attribute clearly affects the application of veil-piercing in China, which fits awkwardly into an economic 
context overwhelmingly dominated by the State.136 SOEs in China were originally conceived as vehicles 
of a centrally-controlled State plan, with no independent legal personality to pierce.137 Liability wasn't an 
issue because it would normally be a case of one state enterprise against another, best resolved by central 
control. While a number of SOEs were later corporatised into “companies limited by shares” and were 
thereby afforded independent status, the State as shareholder still occupies a controlling position in the 
reformed entity. 138  A direct consequence of veil-piercing in these enterprises would be to hold the 
controlling shareholder, i.e. the State, directly liable. The plausibility of doing this remains highly 
controversial since it could be construed as a potential threat to the dominance of State ownership over 
private capital, which goes against the long-established Chinese socialist economy ideology as enshrined 
in the Constitution.139 As for state monopolies, recast as “wholly state-owned limited liability companies”,140 
there remains a vast number of these in the Chinese economy.141 In legal terms they are a form of 
business unit “under ownership by the whole people”,142 with every Chinese citizen being the owner of each 
                                                          
133 For instance, in the General Principles of Civil Law (1986), while some global norms including party equality, party autonomy 
and the protection of citizens’ lawful rights and interests are included, it is emphasised that these were “to meet the needs of the 
developing socialist modernization”. See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted at the Fourth 
Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on April 12, 1986 and promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the 
People’s Republic of China on April 12, 1986, Art. 1. 
134 “In the primary stage of socialism, the State upholds the basic economic system under which public ownership is dominant and the economic sectors of 
diverse forms of ownership develop side by side.” Property Law of the People’s Republic of China, No. 62, effective from October 1, 
2007, Art. 3. See also Potter, supra note 98, at 127. 
135 As a matter of fact, China’s SOEs have maintained their economic dominance as Chinese industry advances and are 
considered to be a major driver of China’s fast-growing national economy. See Michael Schuman, Are China’s Big State Companies a 
Big Problem for the Global Economy? TIME, Feb 15, 2012, available at http://business.time.com/2012/02/15/are-chinas-big-state-
companies-a-big-problem-for-the-global-economy/.  
136 Nicholas Calcina Howson, Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: 
LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION, 138 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010). As argued by Huang, though SOEs can 
be either in the camp of shareholder or that of creditors, the interests of shareholder SOEs prevail when these two rival interest 
groups are in conflict. Huang, supra note 8, at 768. 
137 Howson, supra note 69, at 130.  
138 Howson, supra note 69, at 132. 
139 Supra notes 130–131. 
140 Art. 65 of the Company Law 2005, supra note 4, “The term ‘wholly state-owned company’ … refers to a limited liability company 
incorporated wholly through investment by the state…” 
141 The revised 2005 Company Law devoted an entire section to wholly state-owned companies. See Section Four of the 
Company Law 2005, supra note 4. 
142 SHIZHONG DONG ET AL., TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA – THE CURRENT COMMERCIAL AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK, 25 (1995); see also Art. 3  & 4 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-owned Assets of 
18 
 
SOE.143 The efficacy of veil-piercing in a wholly state-owned company is even more questionable, as 
theoretically the claimant may overlap with the respondent – a Chinese citizen creditor with unsatisfied 
claims is in law also a shareholder of the SOE concerned, with an equal share of ownership interests to be 
claimed against.  
As well as ideological incompatibility, enforcing veil-piercing in a SOE context can be pragmatically 
thorny. Though a policy of “separating government functions from those of enterprises” has been established as a 
core guideline for the new round of Chinese reforms144 and primarily targets state-owned enterprises,145 
current practice still fully embraces an impenetrable legacy of administrative control when it comes to the 
supervision and management of state-owned assets. According to Article 11 of the Law on the State-
Owned Assets of Enterprise,146 ownership rights attached to state-owned assets are executed by the State 
Councils and local governments, who shall delegate their rights to State-owned Asset Supervision and 
Management Commissions to supervise and manage state-owned assets. Leaving aside the closed 
governance circuit of these Commissions, which perform both as inspectors and as managers of state-
owned assets, they need to report to the local governments on a regular basis about their work in 
supervising and managing the State-owned assets,147 and governmental approval must be sought by the 
Commissions prior to decisions about important matters, including the separation, merger, insolvency or 
dissolution of state-owned enterprises. 148  Furthermore, underpinned by the policy imperative of 
preventing the loss of state-owned assets,149 strict assessment rules apply to all state-owned assets in 
China, particularly when they need to be transferred or used to discharge a debt.150 Thus, if the veil of a 
state-owned enterprise on the brink of insolvency is pierced by the court, leaving aside the lengthy 
assessment process, the judgement would not be enforceable unless the approval of both the local 
government and the Commission can be obtained. Relying on authorisation power and control over the 
Commissions, governments can, if they so desire, steer companies and piercing suits in a favourable 
direction. From the litigation standpoint, there is little sense for a claimant in even trying to pierce the 
corporate veil, as he is unlikely to extract money from the State, unless it chooses to pay. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Enterprises (adopted at the 5th session of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China on October 28, 2008, promulgated and effective on May 1, 2009). 
143 The State Council and local governments exercise the ownership rights of State-owned assets as surrogates of the people. See 
Chuan Roger Peng, Limited Liability in China: A Partial Reading of China’s Company Law of 1994, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 263, 264 
(1996); SHIZHONG DONG ET AL., id., 25. 
144 THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA’S CONDITIONS AND POLICIES – WHITE PAPER [中国的能源状况与政策], Dec. 2007; the 
Chinese version is available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-12/26/content_844159.htm.   
145 See Art. 7 of Interim Measures for the Management of the Transfer of the State-owned Property Right of Enterprises, issued 
by State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, and Ministry of Finance on Dec 31, 
2003, effective on Feb 01, 2004, [hereinafter Interim Measures]. 
146 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprise 中华人民共和国企业国有资产管理法, 
promulgated by the NPC on 28 October, 2008, effective from 1 May, 2009, art. 11; See also Interim Measures, id., Articles 4. 
147 Interim Measures, id. art. 15. 
148 Interim Measures, id. art. 21. 
149 Art. 1 of the Interim Measures for the Administration of Assessment of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, 企业国有资产
评估管理暂行办法, issued by State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council on August 
25, 2005, effective on September 1, 2005. 
150 Art. 47 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprise; Art. 6 of the Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Assessment of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, ibid. 
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Incompatibility between the State-Owned Economy and Veil-Piercing – The Practical 
Aspect 
 
With many issues affecting the reconciliation between veil-piercing and state-owned businesses, it appears 
“unrealistic” to think that lawmakers and judiciaries could carry the full burden of resolving these 
complexities,151 especially when they, like any other institutional actors, tend to respond strategically to 
the political and economic elite.152 The awkwardness of the veil-piercing doctrine in the state-owned 
enterprise context has already been demonstrated in the company lawmaking process, implicating the 
dependency approach to legal development in China.153 A wide cross-section of the elite among the Party 
and government officials produced input during the consultation process.154 In particular, the lawmakers 
were closely attuned to the views of state-owned enterprise institutions and government agencies, who 
expressed strong apprehensions about a full-scale imposition of established foreign norms.155 One major 
concern raised was that the prevalence of veil-piercing is out of sync with the predominance of state 
ownership in business activities.156 Not least owing to the idea that piercing would open up a floodgate 
for piercing claims against SOEs, subsequently inflicting huge losses in terms of state-owned assets,157 the 
lawmakers steered clear of the clearly-prescribed draft version158 and instead shaped Article 20(3) in its 
current vague form. From a jurisprudential perspective, this evidences the strong hold of the instrumental 
character of the law in China. Legal reforms do not occur within a political vacuum, and for reforms to be 
successful, they must take into account relevant interests and existing conditions, and make compromises 
whereas necessary.159  
Consistent with the socialist tendency to view law in instrumental terms, while the courts enjoy functional 
independence,160 they also uphold the substantive agendas set by the Party and allegedly prioritise the 
harmony of Chinese society over the interests of individuals.161 When they are construing and applying 
                                                          
151 IFES/USAID, Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality (2002), at 6, available at 
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf. In practice, disputes 
concerning state-owned assets and SOEs are mainly addressed via administrative means. See infra note 166. 
152 Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 3; also Zhu, supra note 8, at 53, suggesting that the Party’s intervention has prevented to some 
extent “judicial corruption and judicial arrogance, two common by-products of the judiciary’s ongoing transformation…” 
153 For a general discussion of the implications of the dependency approach in East Asia, see Frederic C. Deyo, Introduction, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM, 11–22 (Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987). 
154 Corne, supra note 17, at 379. 
155 Chao Xi, Who Writes Corporate Law Rules? The Making of the ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil Rule’ as a Case Study, in THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CHANGE AND CHALLENGES, 168 (Guanghua Yu ed., 2011). 
156 Id., at 168; Further information is available on the SASAC’s website: 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html.  
157 Xi, supra note 155. 
158 The initial draft contained a clear and specific standard of piercing. For further details see Huang, supra note 8, at 772–3. 
159 Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 6. 
160 Judicial independence is established as a fundamental principle underpinning all Chinese laws, as specified in Article 126 of the 
Constitutional Law of PRC: The people’s courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to 
interference by administrative organs, public organisations or individuals. 
161 In the 2013 SPC Work Report, it was emphasised that the operation of the SPC should follow the strong leadership of the 
CPC, and uphold the grand theme of “serving the major objectives and administering justice for the people” (为大局服务，为人民司法). 
See Shengjun Wang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (最高人民法院工作报告) [The Work Report of the SPC], presented at 
the third plenary meeting of the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, 
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legislative instruments, courts inevitably revert to whether the application serves the growing potency of 
China’s economic development and societal harmony, 162  contending that this helps to thwart rule 
fetishism163 and realise the “spirit” rather than the “letter” of the law.164 In practice, in courts’ practice there 
is great deference to State policy and administrative decisions, manifest in their reluctance to review 
administratively-related disputes. 165  Most disputes concerning SOEs are still addressed between 
government departments in a wholly political forum, regardless of the increasing rhetoric of enhancing 
market actor autonomy against the State.166 
Setting aside the conundrum of the particular instances when law should give way to State policy 
imperatives, the congruity of veil-piercing as a legal transplant has been compromised by this instrumental 
view. Evidence shows that courts in China have been carefully circumventing the use of veil-piercing for 
state-owned assets: not only SOEs but also large listed companies have so far been insulated from veil-
piercing claims in China.167 A detailed study of more than a thousand corporate law cases in Shanghai 
courts between 1992 and 2008 revealed that the courts have refused to accept jurisdiction over certain 
disputes due to the influence of the economic and political powers involved in the case.168 Among the 
corporate cases that courts are reluctant to hear, many involved parties are state-owned enterprises or 
wholly state-owned companies.169 Evidence also suggests that the courts have been “specifically directed not to 
accept” public company cases, or steered these cases into political and administrative channels for 
settlement – between 1992 and 2008, topics relevant to public companies accounted for less than 1 per 
cent of the available case opinions.170 This is not least owing to the overriding proportion of State 
ownership in public companies in China, and the close ties between corporate insiders and the ruling 
political elite.171  
While the courts’ reluctance to apply the veil-piercing doctrine to state-owned enterprises and listed 
companies might be construed as serving the national economic and political policy imperatives, it runs 
counter to the legislative goals of piercing. As discussed above, the incorporation of this doctrine into the 
new company law regime was in large part occasioned by the misconduct of controlling shareholders 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
March 10, 2013. The Chinese version is available at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2013-
03/22/nw.D110000renmrb_20130322_2-02.htm. 
162 Lubman, supra note 10, at 5. A typical example is the courts’ reluctance to accept and allow corporate dissolution-liquidation 
pleadings in contravention of the law, as the fall of corporate enterprises is generally considered as shedding negative impacts “in 
different degrees on market order and stability”, including increasing unemployment and rising social costs. Howson, supra note 136, at 
143. 
163 Rule fetishism is used to “describe an excessive attachment to the letter of the law in contradiction with logic, convenience, and justice.” See 
Julieta Lemaitre, Legal Fetishism: Law, Violence, and Social Movements in Columbia (2008) 77 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE 
PUERTO RICO 331, at 332. 
164 Corne, supra note 17, at 412. 
165 Zhu, supra note 8, at 60; Peerenboom, supra note 119, at 509. 
166 Howson, supra note 136, at 138–9. 
167 Since the promulgation of the new Company Law, all successful veil-piercing cases have occurred in small limited liability 
companies in China. Hui, supra note 42, at 3. 
168 Howson, supra note 136, at 137-8; Xin He, The Judiciary Pushes Back: Law, Power, and Politics in Chinese Courts, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION, 180 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010). 
169 Howson, supra note 136, at 138. 
170 Howson, supra note 136, at 144–146. 
171 Supra note 112–116.  
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against small creditors in listed companies. 172  The inapplicability of piercing against state-owned 
businesses to a certain extent compromises the uniformity of application promised by the Chinese 
government in the WTO protocol and also inhibits foreign investors’ enthusiasm for doing business in 
China. As noted by OECD, among the issues surrounding the current regulatory framework in China, a 
prominent difficulty for foreign businesses is the lack of transparency regarding strategic assets (i.e. large 
SOEs) in terms of policy and management.173 During the company law drafting process foreign scholars 
suggested that the application of Article 20(3) should exclude foreign businesses, so that foreign investors 
would not be forced to bear all the piercing liabilities in a company with state-owned assets.174 Though 
the suggestion was eventually turned down, the SPC has promised follow-up judicial interpretation to 
clarify this matter. 175  The interpretation has yet to be produced, and the probability of selective 
application remains at the time of writing. Given the incompatibility between this generalised corporate 
law principle and state-owned businesses, although China’s lawmakers were wholeheartedly committed to 
establishing a veil-piercing regime to impose effective constraints on limited liability, the piercing doctrine 
will likely continue to be selectively applied and be the least effective in cases where it is probably needed 
the most – i.e. in the context of SOEs and large listed companies.  
 
B. Veil-Piercing Practices in Private Company Contexts 
 
As well as its limited application in the state-owned sector, dictated by the unique Chinese socio-
economic setting, the application of veil-piercing in other business sectors (mainly private companies176) 
also informs a cumulative number of clashes between “law” and “truth and substance”,177 manifest in both 
the over-application of the principle in certain contexts and various inconsistencies in implementation.  
As presented by Peerenboom, “congruence of laws on the books and actual practice supposes institutions for 
implementing and enforcing laws.”178 While a full discussion of the role of legal institutions in shaping practices 
might cause us to digress, several institutional deficiencies that are exploited in veil-piercing practice do 
warrant further attention. As will be seen in the sections below, a number of legal institutional deficiencies, 
including a lack of authoritative guidance, conflicting views on judiciary discretion, and loopholes in 
                                                          
172保中小投资者 新《公司法》将“揭开公司面纱”The New Company Law Will Pierce the Corporate Veil to Protect Medium and Small 
Investors. PEOPLE’S DAILY, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1037/3180565.html; see also 
Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 8. 
173 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Investment Committee, Preliminary Findings and Issues for Guidance by the 
Committee, in China’s Mergers and Acquisitions Policies, (2005 Project, Oct. 14, 2005), at 23–27. 
174 Ping et al., supra note 56. 
175 Id. 
176 In China, piercing claims almost invariably happened in private companies. Huang, supra note 42, at 3. 
177 Kahn-Freund, supra note 50, at 57. 
178 Here we adopt the broad conception of institutions, including considerations of ideology, social norms, organisational 
structures and cultures, rules, purposes and outcomes, and moral agendas, to name but a few. See Peerenboom, supra note 119, at 
480 & 505.  
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related areas of law, have all contributed towards exacerbating pragmatic incongruities, quite apart from 
the complexity arising from the intensely factual nature of piercing cases.  
 
a. Over-application of the Principle 
 
At its minimum, congruence between laws on the books and actual practice requires laws to be applied in 
a way that “does not completely defeat people’s expectations”. 179  However, in contradiction to legislators’ 
reiteration that veil-piercing is an exception rather than a norm and that it should be applied with extreme 
caution,180 an inclination towards over-usage is shown in practice.181 The overall rate of piercing in China 
has so far been significantly higher than in overseas countries, and it is rising on a yearly basis.182 In many 
instances the doctrine has been overstretched or incorrectly invoked, a typical instance being shareholders’ 
capital contribution. As initially asserted by a 1994 SPC guidance183 and now enshrined in the 2005 
Company Law, the shareholders of a company are accountable for the company’s debt under two 
undercapitalisation circumstances: (1) if the shareholders’ actual capital injection in the company has met 
the minimum capital requirement in law but failed to pay in full the amount of the company’s registered 
capital, shareholders should be liable for the unsettled claims of the company up to the difference 
between registered capital and paid-up capital;184 (2) if shareholders fail to inject capital into the company, 
or the company’s paid-up capital fails to meet the minimum legal capital threshold, shareholders should 
bear all liabilities thereby incurred, primarily debt obligations.185  
Judging from an ideological perspective, while both circumstances specified above lead to shareholders’ 
liability, it would be inappropriate to categorise either of them into the narrowly-prescribed scope of 
Article 20(3) of the 2005 Company Law. In the first instance, a shareholder failing to make scheduled 
capital contributions is mainly in breach of contract towards the detriment of shareholders who have 
made their capital contributions on schedule and in full amount, rather than jeopardizing creditors’ 
                                                          
179 Peerenboom, ibid., at 480. 
180 As stated by Min Liu, a judge sitting on the SPC, “between the separate legal personality doctrine and the piercing doctrine, the former 
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AND REFERENCE TO CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL JUDGEMENTS IN CHINA (2005) available at 
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=29016. 
181 Liu, supra note 87, at 244; Huang, supra note 8, at 748. 
182 Huang, supra note 42.  
183 Guanyu Qiye Kaiban de Qita Qiye Bei Chexiao Huozhe Xieye hou Minshi Zeren Chengdan Wenti de Pifu (最高人民法院关
于企业开办的企业被撤销或者歇业后民事责任承担问题的批复) [Reply issued by the SPC to the Higher People’s Court of 
the Guangdong Province On the Assumption of Civil Liability after an Enterprise Established by Another Enterprise has been 
Closed or Gone Out of Business], Mar. 30, 1994, FAFU(1994) No.4 [hereinafter Reply 1994].  
184 S. 1(2) of Reply 1994; also Art. 28 & 31 of the 2005 Company Law 
185 S. 1(3) of Reply 1994; Art. 23 of Company Law. 
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interests, which would not prevail until the company is on the brink of insolvency.186 Likewise, the second 
instance is not simply related to veil-piercing – according to Article 23 (2) of the 2005 Company Law, 
capital contributions of shareholders reaching the statutory minimum amount of capital is a necessary 
precondition of incorporation. If shareholders’ capital contributions fail to meet the minimum legal 
threshold, the company will never be duly incorporated and thus would not have a separate legal status,187 
let alone any scope for disregarding such a legal existence. However, there have been a large number of 
judicial decisions mistakenly drawing on Article 20(3) and categorising cases of these two types into the 
“piercing the corporate veil” category. For instance, in Huaxia Bank Shanghai Branch v Shareholders of Shanghai 
Huadong China Petrol Trade Co.,188 shareholders failed to make the amount of capital contributions specified 
in the Articles of Association, which resulted in the company’s registered capital amounting to less than 
the minimum capital threshold. The court agreed that this company had never been conferred a separate 
legal status because the essential requirements of incorporation had never been met, but in reaching this 
conclusion it erroneously drew on Article 20(3) as the legal basis, which only concerns shareholders 
abusing the separate legal status of a duly incorporated company. 
 
b. Loose Drafting and Inconsistencies in Application  
 
When indicating the fragilities of piercing practice, many scholars take issue with the level of generality at 
which the piercing provision is pitched. As argued, piercing has always been an area characterised by 
issues of an intensely factual nature, and it is in need of detailed guidance in terms of application. 189 While 
the general proposition in Article 20(3) is a useful rule of thumb, it does not map out the legitimate 
province of the piercing doctrine. With important terms such as “abuse” undefined, neither does it obviate 
the need for relevant parties to seek additional guidance for application, or instruct the courts how to 
proceed with analysing a veil-piercing case.190 After all, the more meticulous-drafted a law, the more 
robust its implementation – precision minimises wrongdoing in action.191 The inherent vagueness of Art. 
20(3) unquestionably leads to inconsistencies in practice, and further widens the gap between the 
designated goal of restrictive application and pragmatic extravagance.192 
                                                          
186 Art. 28 of Company Law 2005, supra note 4. Likewise, in England, a large number of cases, dating from the nineteenth century 
when partly-paid shares were the norm, provided that the shareholders could be sued for the difference when the company goes 
into insolvency, but not on the ground of veil-piercing.  
187 LINQING WANG, GONGSI SUSONG CAIPAN BIAOZHUN YU GUIFAN (公司诉讼裁判标准与规范) [THE JUDGING CRITERIA 
AND REGULATION OF CORPORATE LITIGATION], 115 (2012). 
188 华夏银行股份有限公司上海分行诉上海华东中油石油销售有限公司等股东滥用公司法人独立地位和股东有限责
任赔偿纠纷案 (2008).  
189 Gelb, supra note 64, at 2; see also United States v Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc., 561 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1977), in which the 
court commented that “[w]hether the corporate veil should be pierced depends upon the innumerable individual equities of each case”. 
190 Wu, supra note 3, at 333. 
191 Corne, supra note 17, at 376. 
192 Wu, supra note 3, at 330. 
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While the loose drafting of law might indeed be a convenient causal factor, it would be wrong to 
overstate its effect in bringing about the practical discrepancy, and a blank denunciation of the ambiguity 
of Article 20(3) fails to capture the complex reality. In point of fact, it is appropriate to portray loose 
drafting and principle-like pronouncements as a major characteristic of all basic laws and statutes in 
China.193 This to some extent is due to the short development period of Chinese law, and the lack of 
experienced draftsmanship – after all, the present Chinese legal system is mainly a product of legal efforts 
undertaken since the 1980s, an astonishingly short period of time in comparison with the centuries over 
which similar Western legal institutions developed. 194  Omissions and general catch-call clauses are 
inevitable occurrences when lawmakers have to design a rule from scratch and have no precedent to 
build upon.  
However, the major rationale dictating such broadly worded legislation is that Chinese lawmakers intend 
them to be exactly that. Based on an instrumental understanding, the “old school” Chinese jurists consider 
law to be superstructural and mere reflections of the economic base of society.195 Given the sweeping 
scale and rapidity of economic reform in China, it is seen as imperative that legislation should begin in a 
principle-like fashion, as “fluid and changeable as the economy and society which it is supposed to regulate.”196 As the 
dynamics of the economy develop and the variations of enterprises change, a broadly-worded law may 
provide adequate scope for corresponding pragmatic experimental action, 197  enabling lawmakers to 
“integrate theory with practice”.198  
Nevertheless, inherent in such a principle-based legal system is an acknowledgement that minutiae must 
be covered by additional rules and interpretations outside the confines of relevant statutory statements.199 
When new situations emerge, the catch-all basic law will quickly be supplemented by additional rules and 
interpretations providing points crucial to the application, which can be promulgated and changed much 
more easily than the basic law itself.200 Therefore, the ambiguity accompanying the flexibility brought 
about by the generic and abstract piercing provision can and should, at least in theory, be mitigated by 
deftly tailored interpretations.201 This echoes the thoughts of Chinese company lawmakers, who expect 
that the statutory piercing provision will form a rough legislative architecture conveying the spirit of the 
law, with follow-up judicial interpretations providing accessible guidance for users. 202  Additional 
interpretations are expected to be provided by both the State Council or other administrative authorities 
                                                          
193 Corne, supra note 17, at 375; Lubman, supra note 10, at 11. 
194 Lubman, supra note 10, at 7.  
195 Lubman, supra note 10, at 36; Corne, supra note 17, at 374; BIX, SUPRA NOTE 14, at 277. 
196 Corne, supra note 17, at 375. 
197 Ibid. 
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in the form of regulations or administrative rules, and the SPC on matters “concerning specific application of 
laws and decrees in judicial proceedings”.203 
However sensible this may sound from a jurisprudential perspective, the institutions and interpretations 
that characterise the Chinese legal environment have not been as effective as envisaged in sweeping away 
the ambiguities. It follows from observations that boundaries of the multiple sources of law and the 
power allocations among institutions to make and interpret laws have been left undefined. According to 
the Legislation Law of the PRC, the National People’s Congress (hereinafter the NPC) enacts “basic laws”, 
the State Council (the head of the executive branch of the government) endorses “administrative laws”, and 
provincial and sub-provincial governments can issue mandatory “local regulations” and “local rules”. 204 
However, the connotations and scope of these essential terms, including “basic laws”, “administrative laws” 
and “local regulations and rules”, remain unclassified, and the respective jurisdictions of these lawmaking 
bodies stay blurred. 205  Furthermore, because the NPC Standing Committee is allocated the role of 
interpreting basic laws under the Constitution, the function of judicial interpretations issued by the SPC is 
legally confined to clarifying issues concerning “specific application of laws and decree in judicial proceedings”.206 In 
reality, however, the Standing Committee has rarely undertaken the interpretation of laws or the 
Constitution, which gives considerable leeway to SPC judicial interpretations (or, as remarked by Corne, 
creates an impingement on the legislative power bestowed by the Legislation Law), either with or without 
law suits.207 This adds to the complexity in lawmaking discussed above, since judicial interpretations 
issued by the SPC also have the force of law.208 In practice, the respective jurisdictions and relationships 
between these lawmaking bodies are commonly arranged via informal negotiations, which results in a 
significant amount of political discretion in enforcing laws, as well as inconsistency in implementation.209 
Such inconsistency has been singled out as among the four biggest challenges for foreign businesses’ 
activities in China.210As remarked by Potter, “inconsistent regulatory performance is often the product of the conflicting 
goals of different bureaucracies, whose regulatory power is subject to few effective limits.”211  
                                                          
203 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Falv Jieshi Gongzuo de Jueyi (全国人民代表大会
常务委员会关于加强法律解释工作的决议) [NPC Resolution on Strengthening the Legal Interpretations of Law], passed by 
the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress as an amendment to the 1955 Standing Committee Resolution 
on the Interpretation of the Law, issued on June 10, 1981, effective from June 10, 1981, Art. 2; Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (法院组织法) 
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205 Wen, supra note 103, at 514–5. 
206 Organic Law, supra note 203, Art. 33. 
207 Corne, supra note 17, at 409–10. 
208 最高人民法院关于司法解释工作的规定 [Provisions Concerning the Work of Judicial Interpretation], issued by the 
Supreme People’s Court on March 23, 2007, effective from April 1, 2007, Art. 5. 
209 THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, INTERPRETATION TO THE LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, §2 
Aug. 1, 2001, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flsyywd/xianfa/2001-08/01/content_140407.htm; L Li, The Division of 
Jurisdictional Discretion in China, Zhengyi (2009), available at http://review.jcrb.com/zyw/n4/ca128229.htm. 
210 Peerenboom, supra note 19, at 17. 
211 Pitman B. Potter, Law Reform and China’s Emerging Market Economy, in CHINA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE: CHALLENGES TO US 
POLICY, 221 (Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States ed., 1997). 
26 
 
Leaving aside the complications in lawmaking, the brevity of China’s company law development also 
defies clarity in terms of the legal interpretation and application of veil-piercing. The nation has only had 
a systematic company law framework for two decades, and the piercing principle was only statutorily 
endorsed six years ago. The short period of performance prevents the availability of comprehensive and 
accessible implementation guidance based on accumulated experience. “For each head of controversy that has 
been cut off, there will arise, hydra-like, one or more new ones. And it will only be decades later, after the codes has become 
overlain with a think encrustation of case law, that the old measure of legal certainty (or uncertainty) will be restored.”212 
Hahlo and Gower’s comments on the deficiency of codification, although presented in a common law 
context, seem apposite in describing China’s current position regarding the field of veil-piercing. 
Although concrete steps have been taken in the direction of building up the “interpretive regimes” necessary 
for the effective function of law in China, much remains to be done.213 To date the SPC has issued three 
judicial interpretations targeting obscurities in the 2006 Company Law, none of which specifically deals 
with the topic of veil-piercing.214 It is predictable that there will be an extended period of flux, at least 
before awaiting clarifications as essential aspects of the law come before qualified judiciaries.  
The riddle of inconsistency in piercing practice brought about by the lack of authoritative interpretation is 
best exemplified by the evaluation of the concerned party’s subjective mind, i.e. whether a shareholder’s 
intent to evade obligations is a prerequisite to piercing the veil. This is a question that has exercised both 
judges and scholars over recent years.215 China’s new company law statute does not take a firm position in 
this regard, and since the advent of Article 20(3) no interpretation with the force of law has been 
attempted on this matter, leading to court judgements and academic commentaries at odds with each 
other. So far, the scholarly view seems to favour intent as an indispensable element in piercing, as well as 
two other essentials – shareholders’ misconduct (in abusing the corporate form) and consequences (in 
terms of impairing the creditors).216 The Vice-Director of the Legalisation Committee of the NPC has 
also emphasised on various occasions that the disregard of the corporate personality principle applies only 
when shareholders have the wilful intent and the behaviour of evading debts (author’s emphasis 
                                                          
212 H.R. Hahlo & L.C.B. Gower, Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace, 30 MOD. L. REV. 241, 249 (1967). 
213 Orts, supra note 20, at 111. 
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added), with consequences of severely damaging creditors’ interests.217 This statement clearly stipulates 
the necessity of an intent element in triggering the principle.  
Given the predominant position of the NPC as the highest level of legislative authority in making and 
approving law, 218  and the asserted pragmatic importance of interpretation that is attributed by 
governmental officials in China,219 it is rational to assume that an interpretations given by the NPC’s 
senior official will carry significant weight. Nevertheless, so far a number of decisions have only pierced 
on the basis of objectionable facts, without taking into account the mental element.220 Paradoxically, in 
these piercing decisions courts confusingly but invariably refer to “the principle of honesty and credibility”, 
which as a general civil law doctrine hinges on an assessment of the state of mind of the relevant party.221 
As presented by Liang, the incorporation of the conception of “honesty and credibility”, one of the 
fundamental moral values underpinning Confucianism,222 is essentially a “legalisation of the fundamental moral 
belief” in the civil law context.223 Meanwhile, because the Chinese legal system initially derived from the 
German regime, this civil law principle to a large extent was a transformed integration of s. 242 of the 
German Civil Code, which prescribes that “an obligator has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good 
faith, taking customary practice into consideration.”224 Both these sources of the honesty and credibility doctrine 
dictate an examination of the state of mind of the parties concerned, over and above the general 
mechanical financial tests.225 The courts’ customary reference to this subjective-mind-based principle in 
piercing cases, although it falls short of examining the parties’ mental states, thus creates an inherent 
ideological contradiction.  
In common law jurisdictions, such legislative ambiguities and paradoxes would be resolved by the 
doctrine of stare decisis, i.e. judicial decisions being both the source and the proof of the law.226 Attempting 
                                                          
217 Yuan, supra note 83, at 8. 
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Commercial Law Web Journal (2008), available at  http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=39452.  
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原则解释：诚信原则的历史，实务，法理研究) [AN INTERPRETATION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW: THE 
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of “honesty and credibility” accords with the Latin conception of bona fides and good faith in English law, both emphasising an element 
of subjective state of mind as well as the objective fact. 
226 Joseph Dainow, supra note 9, at 425. 
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to have the best of both worlds, in 2011 the Supreme People’s Court initiated the publication of Guiding 
Cases (Zhidao Xing Anli 指导性案例). These comprise a selection of typical cases in various fields, in 
the hope of providing clear guidance to local courts when they are judging cases of the same kind.227 
Although these cases do not have the authority of making new laws, they are envisaged as a major move 
towards safeguarding the uniformity and coherence of judicial practice.228  
While one should not be too quick to dismiss the SPC’s commendable attempt, there is good reason to 
be sceptical about the effect of such recourse to Guiding Cases. Lacking the close reasoning and analysis 
in common law judgments, the style of Chinese courts judgments, following the civil law system route, is 
abstract and general, with previous cases not cited or analysed. A Chinese court judgement normally 
consists of a brief summary of the essential facts followed by a succinct statement of the rules of law,229 
and the courts have often limited themselves to expressing conclusions without detailed explanation or 
analysis on the rules.230 While this ruling style springs from civil law judges’ great respect for legislation,231 
it also limits the instructive value of judgements and suggests that Guiding Cases will not have 
comparable effects in clarifying and interpreting law in comparison with judgements in common law 
jurisdictions. The recent Guiding Case concerning veil-piercing – Xugong Group Engineering Machinery Co., 
Ltd vs. Chengdu Chuanjiao Industry and Trading Co., Ltd and Other Respondents on a Dispute over a Purchase and 
Sale Contract 232  – best evidences the limited effect of these Guiding Cases in clarifying the legal 
convolutions. The court pierced the veil of affiliated corporations on the basis of objective facts – the 
commingling of assets233 – and the subjective element of shareholders’ intention was not taken into 
account. However, in justifying the piercing decision, the court also confusingly referred to the principle 
of honesty and credibility, stating that the fact of commingling of assets “infringed the theme of separate legal 
personality and breached the principle of honesty and credibility; the nature and the damaging effect of the behaviour (of 
commingling of assets) fall in the circumstances stipulated in Art. 20(3).”234 While the second half of the judgment 
infers assessing only the objective facts on the basis of “the nature and the damaging impact of the relevant 
behaviour”, reference to the honesty and credibility principle in the first half implicates the necessity of an 
intent element, thus leaving existing complexities untouched.  
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c. The Scope of Judicial Discretion in Making Laws 
 
A critical part of a civil law judge’s approach, as discussed above, is a great respect for legislation as the 
main source of the law.235 On the other hand, a judge in such a system may be in an awkward position if 
the written law is inadequate on a certain topic, as is the case for veil-piercing in China.236 In order to fill 
gaps in the written law and to bring the principle to fruition, courts in China have thus far created a 
number of pragmatic tactics and made new law in many practical instances. This may be fortuitous or not, 
since as discussed above the reality of the loose legal drafting pragmatically endows them with broad 
discretion to do so.237  
While the debate might remain open as to the flexibility and appropriateness of these court reactions, one 
must not overlook the inconsistency and arbitrariness which are their results in application, riding 
roughshod over the uniform principle of “treating like cases alike”.238 For instance, a pragmatic approach 
adopted by many regional courts has been to distribute internal notices and opinions to fill the statutory 
gaps and impact on future case decisions at the local level.239 Though they are not available to the public 
and not as authoritative as Supreme People’s Court interpretations, in reality these internal circulations 
tend to be more powerful in the handling of cases in regional courts.240 However, although the levels of 
legal education and professional standards have improved drastically in China in the past two decades, 
there remains a discrepancy in the quality of the courts, varying widely from the relatively advanced large 
coastal cities to the less developed western inland regions.241 The huge size of the nation and regional 
discrepancies further confound the vision of consistent and uniform implementation. 242  Indeed, by 
allowing too much room in lawmaking and interpretation, practices become prone to derogation, with 
results often far away from the original legislative intent. As critically remarked by Gelatt, “practice, as a 
popular Chinese catch phrase puts it, remains in many cases the sole criterion of truth.”243 
The issue of the burden of proof in piercing cases, which did not receive any mention in the current 
company law framework, exemplifies the practical riddles created by judges’ creative practice. The only 
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legal rule remotely relevant to this matter is Article 64 of Civil Procedure Law, which provides that a party 
to an action is under a duty to provide evidence in support of his allegations.244 This means that a creditor 
seeking to pierce the corporate veil bears the burden of proving that shareholders have abused the 
corporate form to evade debt. However, this general proposition is likely to result in pragmatic difficulties 
in a corporate context. According to Chinese law, all an outsider creditor is given is the information 
concerning the company’s incorporation.245 With no access to the financial details of either the company 
or its shareholders, 246 an outside creditor is in a rather weak position to gather the evidence required by 
Article 64 – it is simply not clear how far insiders abuse their controlling status by dealing to the 
detriment of outside creditors.247 As this is often the case in practice, many judges apply a two-stage test 
in piercing cases instead of the generic rule of Article 64: the burden of proof at the first stage is on the 
claimant (the creditor) to satisfy the court that there is a good arguable case which prima facie falls into the 
piercing sphere. Once this is satisfied, the burden of proof will then be shifted to the defendant (i.e. the 
shareholders) to prove that the corporate form as a separate legal entity and the limited liability regime 
have not been abused. The burden will be mainly on the shareholders, which will to some extent balance 
the information asymmetry between shareholders and creditors.248 For instance, in Mr. Deng v. Mr. Jiang 
and Others,249 it was ruled by the court in the first instance and upheld by the court of final appeal that 
shareholders in the concerned company should bear the burden of proving that they have not abused 
their shareholders’ rights, and in particular that their act did not cause the depreciation or loss of the 
company assets, thereby potentially prejudicing creditors’ interests. 
Setting aside the commendable intent, the legitimacy of these piercing decisions has been severely 
challenged on the basis of the restricted scope available for civil law judges to make new laws. For many, 
the main source of law in a civil law system is legislation, and a court may not use a previous judgement in 
the nature of a general rule.250 In a common law jurisdiction judicial decisions are “both the source and the 
proof of the law”, and judicial techniques of “distinguishing” and “overruling” earlier cases make room for rule 
adjustments in response to new conditions.251 In stark contrast, when a civil law judge applies the law as 
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set forth by the legislative body, her power of interpretation is often regarded as “restricting to the text of the 
law, without the power or technique to complement or modify the law through her interpretation”.252 As commented by 
He, “…[I]n a legal system such as China’s… the courts do not have legislative power and are charged with faithfully 
applying laws and regulations rather than creating law.”253 Not least owing to such salient respect for legislation, a 
number of courts and judges in China have been persisting with the conventional approach, i.e. 
employing general civil law principles (including civil procedural law) as a legal basis to tackle special 
commercial issues when commercial law is silent on the matter.254 Such divergent views about civil law 
judges’ capacity to make laws have thus far generated conflicting judgements in the piercing field, causing 
inconsistencies and confusion.255 In one typical instance, creditors proved that shareholders had unduly 
transferred corporate assets and altered the place of business before satisfying the debt claim, and the 
concerned shareholders did not defend themselves or respond to any of the creditors’ claims, but the 
court nevertheless referred to Article 64 of Civil Procedural Law and refused to pierce on the grounds 
that the creditors didn’t have adequate evidence proving that “the shareholders have abused the corporate form by 
commingling their personal assets and accounts with those of the company concerned”.256 
 
d. Related Areas of Law and Spillover Effects 
 
The efficacy of a statutory provision often depends on whether a legal system as a whole can produce the 
desired results.257 Even taking into account the robust rule-making efforts and the growing coverage of 
legislation in the past few decades, one has to acknowledge that because of its short period of 
development, the Chinese legal system is still in its early years.258 Although progress has undoubtedly been 
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made on each dimension of law,259 this progress has been uneven and some essential pieces are still 
missing from the legislative jigsaw puzzle, generating spillover effects particularly in terms of the 
implementation of veil-piercing. 
A typical related area of law is corporate liquidation. To alleviate the potential shift of  risk from 
shareholders to creditors at the critical point of  liquidation, in many jurisdictions a system of laws is 
available to enable a creditor to rely on the reality of the issued corporate capital, and receive an equitable 
asset distribution should the company go into liquidation. 260  Such rules generally include a detailed 
delineation of liquidators’ powers and duties,261 as well as available remedies for creditors in case a 
liquidator making any default such as malpractice in filing, delivering or making any return, account or 
other document. 262  Furthermore, to prevent the liquidation process from being unduly affected by 
shareholders’ desires, it is often required that a liquidator must be an independent professional, e.g. the 
requirement for a qualified insolvency practitioner in the UK, authorised either as a member of  a 
recognised professional body or as an individual by the Secretary of  State under the Insolvency Act 
1986.263  This secures the independence of  the liquidator from both shareholders and the company 
concerned, so that the liquidation will proceed in a professional and impartial manner. 
In stark contrast, many of these rules are scarce in China’s company law context and uncertainty 
ineludibly abounds.264 Regardless the conflict of  interests between shareholders and creditors at the onset 
of  liquidation, instead of  employing independent liquidators who are professionally trained to carry out 
the task, the law merely asks shareholders of a limited liability company to form a liquidation group, while 
in a joint stock limited company (i.e. a public company) the composition of the liquidation group must be 
determined by the shareholders’ assembly.265 There is no law prescribing the number of people sitting on 
a liquidation group, or the distinction between the role of controlling shareholders and that of small 
individual shareholders in forming a liquidation group.266 The degree of involvement and the duties of 
shareholders in liquidation thus far remain confounded, exemplified by the presence of cases centering 
upon the composition and operation of liquidation groups.267 The liability regime concerning defective or 
non-liquidation cases also falls short of clear delineation. The veil-piercing doctrine, an “equitable principle[s] 
                                                          
259 Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded Assumptions, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
CHINA – LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION, 69-95 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010). 
260 Kahn-Freund, supra note 50, at 60; A. KEAY & P. WALTON, INSOLVENCY LAW: CORPORATE AND PERSONAL, 22 (2nd ed., 2008). 
261 Ss 165–170 of IA 1986. 
262 E.g. s 170 of IA 1986. 
263 See s. 230 & 390–393 of IA 1986; the Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005, SI 2005/524. See also Hannigan, supra note 30, 
at 661. 
264 Lubman, supra note 10, at 76. 
265 Art. 184 of Company Law 2005, supra note 4. 
266 Wang, supra note 187, at 658. 
267 For instance, in Food Store Limited Co. v Baiyu Bank, 某食品商店有限责任公司与某股份有限公司白玉支行股东损害公司
债权人利益责任纠纷案（2012）沪高民五（商）终字第 1号, it was held that joint liability should only be imposed on 
those shareholders in a liquidation who had impeded the operation of corporate liquidation, in contrast with the decision in 
Shanghai Cunliang Trade Limited Co. v Jiang Zhidong & Wang Weiming上海存亮贸易有限公司诉蒋志东，王卫明等, (No. 9 
Guiding Case, Published on 18 September 2012). See infra note 275 and relevant texts.  
33 
 
and rhetoric”,268 has been frequently employed by Chinese courts to fill these statutory voids concerning 
shareholder performance in corporate liquidation.269 By doing this, courts claim that they look at the 
“spirit” rather than the “letter” of the law, since shareholders not completing liquidation, while it is not 
explicitly prescribed in law, does at least touch on the spirit of veil-piercing.270 For instance, in Mr. Cheng 
and Other Shareholders of Bichengli Co. v Mr. Lu,271 although no evidence was presented to suggest that Mr. 
Cheng and other shareholders deliberately delayed or impeded the liquidation process, the court held 
shareholders liable for the company’s debt on the grounds that “shareholders are expected to fulfil the obligation 
of processing liquidation in a proactive manner, rather than being passive about it…”272 Likewise, in the case of Xiong 
Shupeng v Xu Shimou and Others,273 the court has expressed a similar view on shareholders’ obligations in 
liquidation, that when a company is facing termination the party responsible for liquidation should duly 
manage and dispose of the company’s assets, debts, and other related matters. The corporate veil was also 
pierced on the ground that the shareholders had not duly completed liquidation.274  
It is possible to take issue with the application of veil-piercing in such circumstances, especially the lack of 
regard to non-controlling shareholders in limited liability companies. Even if we ignore the conflict of 
interests between shareholders and creditors at the critical point of liquidation, these individual 
shareholders normally do not possess the controlling power or the essential professional expertise to 
initiate and complete a complicated company dissolution process, and a complete revocation of their 
limited liability by means of piercing seems too harsh a punishment. An example in this regard is the No. 
9 Guiding Case Shanghai Cunliang Trade Limited Co. v Jiang Zhidong & Wang Weiming. The concerned 
company in this case did not complete liquidation and the corporate assets were lost, with the remaining 
unable to satisfy debt claims. Although the two minority shareholders, Mr. Jiang and Mr. Wang, presented 
evidence to the court proving that they had duly employed lawyers to proceed with the liquidation, and 
the fact of the company being wholly controlled by another shareholder, Mr. Fang, actually impeded their 
efforts, the court nevertheless held Jiang and Wang jointly liable for the corporate debt on an unlimited 
basis. “As Company Law and relevant judicial interpretations do not specify the circumstances raised by Jiang and Wang, 
regardless their share ownership proportion or the degree of control in corporate operations, the shareholder status of Jiang and 
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Wang obligates them to complete the liquidation.”275 Judging by the two common ideals thwarting veil-piercing – 
shareholders’ nonhindrance of creditors’ claims and affirmative support of creditors’ interests276 – Jiang 
and Wang could be seen as having complied with both, as shown by their proactive efforts of employing 
lawyers to tackle liquidation affairs. Compared to other remedy methods in liquidation cases, piercing and 
imposing liability to the full extent of shareholders’ personal assets also tend to overcompensate the 
creditors for the harm caused by shareholders’ performance or non-performance, especially when 
shareholders’ personal assets exceed the size of the capital inadequacy during liquidation.277 Not least 
owing to these concerns, radically contrasting decisions are common in this field. For instance, in Mr. 
Huang v Guanxi Branch of China Agricultural Bank, 278  the court, in contradiction with the judgements 
mentioned above, ruled that the bank as a shareholder of the concerned company was not jointly liable 
for the corporate debt, notwithstanding the fact that the liquidation had never completed. It is clear that 
legal reforms to advance the consistency of veil-piercing practice in China, even only in a private 
company context, would entail a wide range of changes that would affect not only the wording of 
company law, but also the systemic development of substantive and procedural law in related fields, 
increasing the availability of clearly-articulated authoritative interpretations as well as providing a precise 
delineation of the discretion of the judiciary in interpreting and making laws. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
There seems to be a general assumption underpinning the recent inauguration of the veil-piercing 
doctrine in China that this Western-style principle ought to be applicable and effective in this nation.279 
To date an extensive body of scholarship in China has commented on the ideological implications of this 
common law-originated doctrine, but the large literature has spawned relatively little in terms of 
contextual specifics, an imbalance which this article seeks to redress.  
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Stepping back from the policy rhetoric of interest-balancing and accessibility, this article has considered 
several pragmatic issues that have emerged in recent veil-piercing practice. In contradiction of the 
laudable legislative agenda of a uniform application of law, complications to do with economic and 
political legacies in the Chinese national context have had a strong restraining effect on the applicability 
of the veil-piercing doctrine. The entrenched stability of China’s state-dominated economic regime, and 
mainstream jurisprudential thought that prioritises national social and economic policy over and above 
more specific mandates set forth in the Company Law,280 disturbs the even-handed practical application 
of veil-piercing. Instead of the uniform and impartial implementation promised in China’s WTO 
Accession Protocol, state-owned enterprises and large listed companies have been almost immune from 
piercing claims in practice, due in part to the close ties between these business sectors and the ruling 
economic and political powers.281 The application of veil-piercing in non-state-owned economic sectors 
has also been affected by China’s complicated socio-cultural context. Although there is no non-arbitrary 
or universal way of mapping out the precise degree to which legal practice is considered consistent or 
not,282 one cannot overlook the fact that the veil-piercing application has so far fallen considerably short 
of the designated ideals of clarity and consistency, particularly in private company contexts.  
While some might take issue with the ambiguous wording of the veil-piercing provision and argue that 
the answer lies in a new clearly-articulated provision, in the absence of a broad legal context that facilitates 
its operation it is hard to see how a word change alone can achieve the aim. As discovered in Part IV, a 
number of legal institutional factors, including the lack of authoritative guidance, contradictory views on 
judiciary discretion and loopholes in related areas of law, have all contributed towards the pragmatic 
inconsistencies. Indeed, as stated by Pistor, “…[f]or an adequate assessment of the quality of the law, … without 
analysing the conditions for establishing (legal) rights gives a distorted picture.”283  
The minimal applications of veil-piercing in SOEs and flawed usages in private company contexts are to a 
large extent rooted in the incompatibility of China’s current domestic dynamics and this Western-
originated legal norm, which will continue to restrict its pragmatic force. As noted, “even when law is 
transplanted, the law does not necessarily precede the development of a country’s enterprise or financial sector.” 284 
Meanwhile, thinking coherently about limited liability, as with so much else in company law,285 also 
requires us to treat veil-piercing cases as exceptions rather than the norm, and constrains its excessive use 
in non-state-owned sectors. As the legal system gradually builds up, it is foreseeable that the veil-piercing 
doctrine will become increasingly confined in the Chinese context. 
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